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ABSTRACT. Political economy explains the behavior of politicians by regulatory 
capture and by ideology. Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial 
accounting. Prior evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture 
by special interests explains these interventions. Politicians tend to view accounting 
regulation as a technical issue where ideological views play a minor role. However, 
many accounting rules directly lead to economic or social consequences, such as 
income distribution or private-sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences 
varies with a politician’s ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those 
consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and also explains a politician’s stance on 
the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent 
political debates about fair value accounting during the financial crisis and the 
expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special 
interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly 
those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting 
regulation (i.e., bank bail-outs and top-management compensation). Once the debates 
focus on more technical issues, political connections to special interests remain the 
most dominant force. 
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“This is a public policy issue. This is not an accounting issue.” 
Rep. David Dreier (R-Calif.), co-sponsor of a House bill on the 
accounting for stock options (Spinner, 2003). 
 “From the outset of the hearing, it seemed clear to me this was not going 
to be a neutral discussion of the issues.”  
Robert H. Herz, former FASB Chair, about the congressional hearing 
on mark-to-market accounting in March 2009 (Herz, 2013)  
 
1. Introduction 
While political forces are arguably shaping accounting standards (Zeff, 2005), we know 
little about the motives behind politicians’ involvement in the agenda-setting or due process of 
independent standard-setters (Gipper et al., 2013). Prior literature in accounting has 
predominantly focused on the theory of regulatory capture, which explains politicians’ behavior 
as a response to special interest pressure from constituents and donors (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 
1971). Evidence from accounting regulation is largely consistent with this view (Farber et al., 
2007; Ramanna, 2008; Zeff, 2005). Political economy offers an additional explanation and 
provides evidence that, beyond special interest pressure, politicians’ ideology is shaping the 
outcome of the political process (Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Kau and Rubin, 1979; Levitt, 1996; 
Mian et al., 2010; Poole and Rosenthal, 1985, 1996). So far, little evidence exists that ideology 
plays any distinct role in the politics of accounting standard-setting. The technical nature of many 
financial accounting issues tends to mute ideological motivations: “Legislators and their staff 
typically know nothing, and could not care less, about accounting standards” (Zeff, 2010). Put 
differently, accounting rule-making is a “thin political market” and generally determined by a 
few specialists (Ramanna, 2015), leaving little room for ideology1.  
                                               
1  By ideology, for this paper and in line with political science (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal, 2011, 2013), we refer to a 
politician’s preference towards the role of government in the market process. Even though the preference is 
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However, many accounting rules have real economic or social consequences. For 
example, bank accounting rules determine regulatory capital and, thus, affect the likelihood of 
regulatory interventions such as the use of taxpayers’ money for bank bail-outs. Similarly, 
accounting rules for stock option plans make different compensation schemes more or less 
attractive and, thus, affect the compensation of managers. Many of these economic consequences 
are affiliated with ideological views (e.g., liberals will prefer the restriction of excessive top 
management compensation, while conservatives will oppose the spending of public resources on 
private-sector bail-outs). Ideological views on these economic consequences plausibly spill over 
to political debates about accounting regulation, even if the accounting question itself is not an 
ideological one. 
In this study, we investigate public statements and sponsorship of bills by U.S. legislators 
as a proxy for their involvement in two prominent accounting debates. Our investigation aims to 
shed light on the underlying forces of political involvement in accounting standard-setting. The 
first debate concerns the issue of fair value accounting during the 2008-09 financial crisis and, 
ultimately, led to the relaxation of the FASB’s fair value accounting rules in April 2009 (Herz, 
2013). The rules change had direct consequences for the regulatory capital adequacy of financial 
institutions and, thus, affected the likelihood of the financial industry’s request for a transfer of 
taxpayers’ resources during the crisis. The second debate touches on the expensing of stock 
options that firms grant to their employees and took place in 2003-04 around the FASB’s 
adoption of SFAS 123. The expensing of employee stock options leads to a front-loading of 
personnel costs and is providing incentives to curb the stock-option plans for top managers. 
                                               
located on a continuum, we distinguish between a conservative (anti-government intervention) and a liberal or 
progressive (pro-government intervention) ideology. 
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In both debates, the potential influence of special interest pressure through political 
connections (beyond politicians’ ideology) is evident. The relaxation of fair value write-downs 
helps banks avoid costly interventions by supervisors. The expensing of employee stock options 
would substantially hit the net income of firms with extensive stock option plans, especially in 
the high-tech industry (Farber et al., 2007). The simultaneous influence of both factors creates the 
empirical challenge as well as the tension. To achieve the passing of beneficial regulation, the 
affected firms had strong incentives to exploit their connections with politicians. Industry 
contributions (which establish political connections) tend to be aligned with past voting behavior 
(which best represents a politician’s ideology), because firms are more willing to donate to 
politicians who have some track record of supporting an agenda that is consistent with their 
interests (Mian et al., 2010).  
To overcome the empirical challenge of disentangling politicians following their 
ideological agenda from politicians catering to special interests, our empirical strategy takes 
advantage of the observation that political participation in the fair value debate and in the stock 
option debate changed over time and peaked at two distinct points in time with the potential role 
of ideology in the debate plausibly varying between these two points. The fair value debate first 
peaked in fall 2008 as part of the general debate about the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(EESA) and the corresponding bank bail-outs (inconsistent with a conservative ideology). The 
debate peaked again in March/April 2009 as part of the more specific discussion about the 
issuance of FASB Staff Positions (FSP) 157-4 and 115-2 providing firms with the opportunity to 
more easily forgo restrictive fair value write-downs; i.e., after Congress had passed the EESA bill 
and the political debate about bank bail-outs was settled. The stock option debate first peaked in 
March 2003 with the congressional vote on H.R. 1372 that generally prohibited the SEC from 
introducing any accounting rules requiring stock option expensing (rejected). The debate peaked 
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again in summer 2004 with the congressional vote on H.R. 3574 that was modified such that it 
now allowed mandating stock option expensing for the five highest-paid executives; thus 
introducing an incentive for firms to limit the compensation of top managers (consistent with a 
liberal ideology). 
While special interests remain relatively constant throughout the two debates, we use (1) 
the variation in the timing of the political statements and, thus, the varying role of ideological 
views on potential economic consequences (bank bail-outs and top-management compensation) 
at the time of these statements; and (2) the cross-sectional variation in politicians’ ideological 
preferences towards these economic consequences to disentangle the role of ideology and the role 
of special interests. In addition, we explore the context and the content of the political statements 
by means of textual analysis and link the political arguments embedded in the statements to the 
variation in politicians' ideology and special interest connections. 
For our analyses, we exploit the high level of political interest in the two accounting 
topics. The political attention manifests in a total of 139 members of the 110th U.S. House of 
Representatives publicly commenting on the issue of fair value accounting in 2008 or 2009 and in 
a total of 154 members of the 108th House of Representatives co-sponsoring at least one of the 
two bills on the expensing of stock option plans.2 We collect data on the content and timing of the 
statements through intensive text mining, searching through press releases, press articles, 
speeches, interviews, public hearings, congressional reports, and other publicly available 
documents. In the next step, we use data on campaign contributions as a proxy for connections 
between members of Congress and donating firms. Finally, we borrow from the political sciences 
                                               
2  The participation is also high relative to other prominent accounting controversies. For example, Ramanna (2008) 
identifies 43 distinct members of Congress who took active, pro-pooling positions during the discussion about the 
FASB’s business combination project and the events leading up to the introduction of SFAS 142. 
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literature (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985) and use data on politicians’ past voting behavior in the 
House to measure representatives’ ideology. 
Our results document that the decision to become involved in an accounting debate is 
positively associated with both the politician’s connection to special interest by private-sector 
firms and the politician’s track record of voting in the Congress (i.e., the ideological agenda). 
However, the ideology of politicians who participate in the debates around the two peaks varies 
substantially in the predicted directions, consistent with ideological views on the underlying 
economic consequences explaining politicians’ behavior beyond special interest pressure.  
In early October 2008, when the fair value debate was part of the EESA controversy, 
political connections to the financial services industry explain the political activity to a much 
lesser extent than in spring 2009. Although a small group of ideologically diverse politicians with 
strong connections to the financial services industry initially put the idea of relaxing fair value 
rules on the political agenda, the proposal found strongest support by, on average, those 
politicians with the most conservative track record in the House. The content and context of the 
statements from this early period suggest that these politicians view the relaxation of fair value 
accounting as a means of bolstering banks’ regulatory capital and stabilizing the financial system 
without the highly visible EESA bailouts.  
The behavior of politicians is very similar during the stock option debate. Initially, 
conservative politicians with strong connections to affected firms (and some liberals with special 
interest pressure from their home districts in California and Massachusetts) rigorously oppose 
any expensing of employee stock options and dominate the debate around the congressional 
hearings on H.R. 1372 (the Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act) in March 2003. 
Congress did not pass the bill and, later that year, Representatives introduced a revised act (H.R. 
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3574) that now allowed stock-option expensing for the five highest-paid top managers but not for 
any lower-ranked employees. The amendment to the bill is an attempt to limit the compensation 
of top managers through a regulatory intervention and, thus, consistent with a liberal ideology. 
The new bill receives support by my more Representatives and gets passed in the House in July 
2004. We observe that the new co-sponsors of H.R. 3574, who did not support H.R. 1372 before, 
have about the same level of connections with interested parties from the private sector. 
However, consistent with ideology explaining political involvement in accounting standard-
setting beyond special interests, these new supporters significantly differ from the previous ones 
in the level of their political ideology; i.e., they are significantly more liberal. 
Our paper makes contributions to at least two different strands of the literature in 
accounting and economics. First, we contribute to the literature on the political economy of 
accounting standard-setting (Gipper et al., 2013; Skinner, 2008; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Prior accounting literature has shown that campaign contributions from firms are associated with 
the positioning of Congress members on accounting-related questions (Ramanna, 2008) and that 
campaign contributions increase in how much is at stake for a firm when accounting rules are to 
be revised (Dechow et al., 1996; Farber et al., 2007). We document that, in addition to special 
interest pressure, ideology provides distinct incentives for politicians to get involved in a debate 
about financial accounting issues. In our setting, we explain the role of ideology by the link 
between accounting regulation and its economic consequences. Politicians who oppose a 
particular government intervention (e.g., a bailout) for ideological reasons tend to favor a change 
in accounting rules that makes such a government intervention less likely. Overall, we find that 
economic theory (Kau and Rubin, 1979; Peltzman, 1985; Stigler, 1971), explaining legislators’ 
voting behavior by regulatory capture and ideology, also holds in an accounting context that is 
widely viewed as a purely technical matter. 
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Second, we contribute to the economics-based literature on political connections and 
policymaking during an economic crisis. Mian et al. (2010) document that ideology plays a role 
in how strongly the voting of Congress members on the 2008 economic stimulus package (the 
EESA) is associated with special interests of politically connected firms and constituent interests 
of voters in the home district. Acemoglu et al. (2016) show that financial firms with previous 
connections to Timothy Geithner experienced strongly positive returns around the announcement 
of his nomination for treasury secretary in November 2008. Tahoun and Van Lent (2013) provide 
similar evidence when measuring the political connections by the stock ownership of Congress 
members. We show how legislators responded to special interest pressure during the recent crisis 
by pushing the standard-setter through active participation in a public debate. While the FASB 
was initially very reluctant to redesign accounting rules, politicians themselves pushed the issue 
on the standard-setter’s agenda (“If you do not act, we will,” see Appendix B.1). In this context, 
our paper also adds to the limited evidence on agenda setting during a crisis (see Allen, 2014). 
 
2. Political Interventions in Accounting Standard Setting 
2.1. Conceptual Background 
Political economy, in general, offers three different explanations for politicians’ actions 
(see also Kothari et al., 2010). First, public interest theory argues that politicians act in the best 
interest of the public and thus attempt to pass socially optimal legislation that corrects market 
imperfections (Posner, 1974). Prior evidence from political economy is inconsistent with this 
view and, therefore, we focus on the two remaining explaining explanations. 
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Second, the principal-agent theory of regulation (also known as the theory of regulatory 
capture) suggests that politicians act in their self-interest. Politicians’ self-interest is re-election, 
and the theory explains politicians’ actions specific to their impact on the likelihood of re-
election. The likelihood of re-election potentially increases with greater campaign funding and 
with greater economic satisfaction of the politician’s constituents (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; 
Peltzman, 1976, 1984). Politicians (i.e., the agents) will therefore tend to cater to special 
economic interests of their donors and constituents (i.e., their principals) that will not necessarily 
be aligned with the interests of the general public. Under this theory, specific economic benefits 
from accounting regulation for a politician’s donors or voters can explain the public involvement 
in accounting standard-setting. 
A third explanation of politicians’ behavior is ideology (Kau and Rubin, 1979; Poole and 
Rosenthal, 1985; Levitt, 1996). Ideology, under this view, is a firm set of principles or core 
beliefs about political issues, particularly the role of government and markets (e.g., Kalt and 
Zupan, 1984). Ideology is typically located on a left-right or liberal-conservative continuum (e.g., 
Poole and Rosenthal, 1996). What the sources of ideology are is still a largely unresolved 
question; ideology could, for example, either arise from a politician’s innate personal beliefs (i.e., 
be determined by genetics and socialization; e.g., Smith et al., 2012) or be used rationally as a 
signaling device to appeal to a specific electorate (Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Poole and Rosenthal, 
1996). Independent of its source, ideology can explain politicians’ public involvement in the 
accounting debates if politicians were linking the accounting issue to their ideological agenda. 
We use two different settings to test the driving forces behind politicians’ involvement in 
accounting standard-setting and to disentangle the role of ideology and the role of special 
interests. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972549 
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2.2. Fair Value Debate during the 2008-09 Financial Crisis 
With the financial crisis intensifying in 2008, many industry representatives, regulators, 
and some academics argued that fair value accounting, by requiring financial institutions to write 
down their assets to abnormally low market prices observed on distressed financial markets, 
would create a downward spiral through fire sales, reducing regulatory capital and restricting the 
ability to lend (e.g., ABA, 2008a; MBA, 2008; see Allen and Carletti, 2008; Plantin et al., 2008; 
Laux and Leuz, 2009, 2010, for an academic perspective on this argument). The involvement of 
politicians in this debate about the regulation of fair value accounting peaked at two distinct 
points in time. 
Critics of fair value accounting achieved a first notable political success when the U.S. 
Congress passed the EESA on October 3, 2008.3 The EESA was a comprehensive economic 
stimulus package that Congress passed in response to the market turmoil after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy and the collapse of other major financial institutions such as AIG, Fannie 
Mae, and Freddie Mac.4 The EESA included a clause that granted the SEC with an option to 
suspend the use of fair value accounting in firms’ SEC filings (section 132). At the same time, 
Congress mandated the SEC to conduct a study on fair value accounting’s impact on the then-
ongoing crisis. The SEC later concluded that fair value accounting had not played too meaningful 
a role in the market turmoil during the crisis (SEC 2008).  
                                               
3  Several members of Congress, from both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, publicly proposed to 
suspend fair value accounting rules. Appendix A includes an excerpt from a letter written by 65 members of 
Congress on September 30, 2008, urging the SEC Chairman Christopher Cox to “immediately shore up the capital 
of the nation’s banking system by suspending the use of fair value accounting” (Congress of the United States, 
2008). Then-Speaker of the House John Boehner confirms this view in a Fox News interview on October 2 (see 
Appendix B.2).  
4  For an overview on relevant political events and interest group actions between September 2008 and May 2009, 
please refer to the timeline of events in Appendix C. 
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It becomes evident from Figure 1 that, around the congressional voting on the EESA in 
early October 2008, Congress members with a conservative reputation opposed the EESA most 
strongly because active government interventions such as bail-outs are least appealing to 
conservatives and their voter base (Mian et al., 2010). At the same time, politicians who commit, 
for whatever reason, to a conservative ideology are also more likely to view the relaxation of fair 
value rules as one alternative means (and as part of a list of additional measures) of bolstering 
banks’ regulatory capital and thus stabilizing the financial system. A contemporaneous debate in 
the public media made these arguments easily accessible. This prediction is in line with anecdotal 
evidence from statements by Congress members. A number of Congress members are explicitly 
painting the change in accounting rules as an alternative to using tax payers’ money for costly 
bailouts (e.g., Hunter, 2008; Orol, 2008): “I support a plan that would have Wall Street bail itself 
out, not hardworking taxpayers, by requiring institutions to insure troublesome assets that are 
causing today’s credit crunch. It would suspend mark-to-market accounting” (Michele 
Bachmann, R-MN). 
Despite the findings in the SEC study, financial services organizations intensified their 
lobbying campaign against fair value accounting in early 2009. Following these efforts, the 
political debate peaked for a second time on March 12, 2009, when the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Financial Services Committee held a public hearing on mark-to-market accounting. During the 
hearing on March 12, 2009, several members of the subcommittee exerted substantial pressure on 
SEC Acting Chief Accountant James L. Kroeker and FASB Chairman Robert H. Herz to act 
quickly on the matter of fair value accounting.5 
                                               
5   In his opening statement, the Chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Paul Kanjorski, said, “We can, however, 
no longer deny the reality of the procyclical nature of mark-to-market accounting. It has produced numerous 
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Only three weeks later and within the time frame that Rep. Gary L. Ackerman had 
proposed during the hearing, the FASB issued three staff positions (FSP FAS 157-4, FSP FAS 
115-2, and FSP FAS 124-2) related to the determination and disclosures of fair values and the 
treatment of other-than-temporary impairments (OTTI). In essence, the accounting changes offer 
less restrictive requirements for the recognition of OTTI charges and provide more flexibility to 
transfer assets into Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, where firms can use unobservable 
estimates. In combination, these changes helped banks reduce the recognition of unrealized fair 
value losses and OTTIs, and thus mitigated the impact of fair value write-downs and impairments 
on earnings and regulatory capital.6 Prior literature has examined the market reactions of events 
associated with the relaxation of fair value accounting rules (Bhat et al., 2011; Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2012; Bowen and Khan, 2014). Overall, these studies document that the accounting 
changes the FASB made during the crisis had significant economic impact. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that special interest groups influenced the political actions 
towards the FASB at this point in time. For example, then-ABA President Edward Yingling later 
claimed about the congressional hearing on March 12, 2009: “We worked that hearing. We told 
people that the hearings should be used to talk about the big problems with ‘mark-to-market,’ 
and you had 20 straight members of Congress, one after another, turn to FASB and say, ‘Fix it’” 
(Pulliam and McGinty, 2009). Against this background, regulatory capture is a plausible 
explanation for politicians’ involvement in the fair value debate. The outcome of the fair value 
                                               
unintended consequences, and it has exacerbated the ongoing economic crisis. If the regulators and standard setters 
do not act now to improve the standards, then the Congress will have no other option than to act itself” (U.S. House, 
2009). See Appendix B.1 for an illustrative excerpt from the congressional hearing on mark-to-market accounting. 
6  Unrealized fair value losses of trading assets reduce a bank’s regulatory capital one-to-one, and so do fair value 
write-downs on securities classified as held to maturity or available for sale if the impairment is deemed to be 
other than temporary. Reductions in regulatory capital put a bank at greater risk of costly regulatory interventions, 
trigger the issuance of equity securities under potentially unfavorable market conditions, or increase the likelihood 
that the bank applies for TARP funding. 
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regulation from April 2009 manifests in a wealth transfer to the financial industry with some 
institutions benefiting more from the transfer than others. The magnitude of the benefit varies 
with banks’ ability to take advantage of the new accounting options. More specifically, the 
benefit depends on the prior usage of the accounting categories addressed by the new rules and 
the magnitude of the unrealized losses, the recognition of which a bank can potentially forgo. 
Since prior literature provides evidence that connections between Congress members and private-
sector firms vary within Congress (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998; Ramanna, 2008; Tahoun, 
2014), the magnitude by which a connected bank potentially benefits from fair value relaxation 
also varies across different Congress members.  
2.3. Stock Option Debate in 2003-04 
In light of the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002, several prominent figures in politics 
and the investment industry publicly blamed excessive stock-based compensation as a major 
source of corporate wrongdoing. These critics called for mandatory expensing of employee stock 
options to set the right incentives for executives (Buffett, 2002; Krim, 2002). Existing accounting 
rules at the time effectively allowed firms to choose whether or not to recognize such an expense 
(SFAS No. 123 and APB No. 25). The accounting choice resulted from intense political pressure 
during the initial development of these standards in the mid-1990s (Dechow et al., 1996; Farber 
et al., 2007).  
When the debate revived in 2003, managers especially from the high-tech industry with 
many stock-option plans in place gained some early Congressional support and publicly voiced 
concerns about any changes in the accounting for stock options. Despite this opposition, the 
FASB announced on March 12, 2003 that it would add an employee stock option project to its 
agenda. In a testimony before the U.S. House Energy and Commerce subcommittee, the FASB 
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chairman made clear that the Board would support the full and immediate expensing of employee 
stock options (FASB, 2003). The expensing front-loads personnel costs and, thus, potentially 
provides incentives to curb the usage of stock-option plans. As an immediate response, Reps. 
Davis Dreier (R-Calif.) and Anna G. Eshoo (D-Calif.), representing the Silicon Valley region, 
introduced H.R. 1372, the “Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act”, on March 20, 
2003. The proposed bill mandated a moratorium on any new accounting standards on stock 
options. Although the bill was sponsored by a bi-party group of 111 representatives, it did not 
make it out of the corresponding subcommittee. 
The most important concerns about H.R. 1372 came from liberal politicians who argued 
that the bill did not sufficiently address the misguided executive incentives that arise from stock 
option usage. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the discussion about the accounting for stock 
options led to severe disagreement especially within the Democratic party between a more 
populist left-wing and a more centrist, pro-business line. While some Representatives argued that 
the abuse of stock options had been central to corporate scandals and justified government 
interventions, other Representatives supported the arguments of the industry to maintain current 
accounting rules and foster the widespread use of employee stock options (Schlesinger, 2003). 
Especially more liberal politicians faced an ideological dilemma.  
In November 2003, Richard Baker, chairman of the relevant subcommittee, introduced 
H.R. 3574, the “Stock Option Accounting Reform Act”. Unlike H.R. 1372, the new proposal 
mandated the expensing of stock options granted to the five highest-paid executives; it still did 
not allow the expensing of any other employee stock options. The revised bill tries to strike a 
balance between conservative demands for recognizing no expense at all (i.e., not intervening 
into management compensation) and more liberal demands that sought to limit excessive 
compensation through government intervention. The bill received bi-partisan co-sponsoring by 
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131 representatives. After it became clear in spring 2004 that the FASB would still propose to 
mandate the expensing of all employee stock options, the bill quickly passed the committee and 
got approved by a vote of 312 to 111 in the House on July 20, 2004 (although it ultimately did 
not pass Senate).  
While the political support of both H.R. 1372 and H.R. 3574 is clearly in line with a 
special interest explanations (e.g., Farber et al., 2007), it is difficult to explain the change in 
political support for the latter bill with differences in special interest connections. It is not clear 
what the benefit of expensing top-management stock options for any connected firm would be. 
Even if these firms were already voluntarily expensing their employee stock options, the potential 
benefit of a mandate for their competitors seems to be too small to actively lobby for such a 
regulation. In contrast, the potential economic consequences vary substantially between these two 
bills with the consequences of the latter bill (i.e., the curbing of top-management compensation) 
being more consistent with a liberal ideology. 
2.4. External Validity 
While political interference in accounting standard-setting has a long history, both in the 
U.S and internationally (e.g., Zeff 2005, 2010), the two cases we examine are by no means 
representative of the average involvement of executive or legislative branches of government. 
Most accounting debates never leave the sphere of technical expert groups and private standard-
setters. A discussion of both the external validity of the insights of our study as well as whether 
political interference really matters for standard setting outcomes in general is thus warranted. 
First, even though our settings do not represent the average standard-setting process, high-
level political involvement is by no means an exceptional event. Zeff (2010) presents a list of 
eleven debates about accounting standards in which Congress interfered through its various 
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channels of interaction (e.g., submitting “Dear colleague” letters to FASB and SEC, holding a 
Subcommittee Hearing, proposing alternative legislations, voting on the bills). In an electronic 
search of the Congress archive, we are able to identify 49 bills over the period from 1993 until 
today that suggest some alternative accounting treatment. These bills were co-sponsored by 
overall 1,099 members of Congress. These congressional activities naturally represent the lower 
bound of political involvement, as most interactions likely happen informally (behind closed 
doors) and are not observable.   
Second, once accounting controversies escalate into the political domain, they are no 
longer framed around technical arguments, but around economic and social consequences (Zeff 
1978, 2010). The strong link between public policy and accounting issue becomes particularly 
apparent from the content analysis of the 49 Congressional bills that suggest alternative 
accounting treatment. 22 of these bills contain a bundle of measures where accounting regulation 
is part of a broader package meant to tackle the policy issue (just as fair value regulation was 
only one part of the much more comprehensive EESA).  
Third, while we motivate and predict the link between accounting regulation and its 
economic consequences explicitly for our two settings, it seems likely that such links equally 
exist in other standard setting debates and, therefore, lead to a predictable role of politicians’ 
ideology in accounting standard setting. Consistent with the findings in our study, the economic 
consequences of accounting regulation and the importance of these consequences in the current 
political environment will determine the relevance of ideology. For example, politicians with 
conservative ideology will tend to oppose FASB proposals that can be perceived as regulatory 
intervention in markets or corporates. The more prominently the market intervention is perceived 
in public (such as the bank bail-outs around the EESA), the more likely will be the politician’s 
involvement in the debate. 
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Finally, the FASB is a rational political player itself and constantly assesses the likelihood 
of ultimately being overruled by Congress or SEC. Therefore, the FASB will anticipate 
potentially critical positions and adjust its standard-setting decisions ex ante to avoid the costs of 
political interventions. Against this background, the impact of political forces on the ultimate 
standard setting outcome is significantly larger than for the prominent controversies that we are 
able to observe from the congressional archives. 
 
3. Data and Cross-Sectional Analysis  
3.1. Measurement of Political Involvement in the Fair Value Debate 
Our unit of analysis is the individual politician. We obtain data on all members of the 
110th Congress from Charles Stewart III and Jonathan Woon’s Congressional Data Page 
(http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html). The initial data collection includes all 
politicians that were members of the Senate and House of Representatives in the second half of 
2008. In our analysis, we focus on the members of the House of Representatives only, because 
the ultimate political pressure towards the FASB (e.g., the mark-to-market hearing on March 12, 
2009) originated from House members. Our final sample comprises 434 distinct representatives.7 
To measure the behavior of politicians, most prior studies in political economy use 
congressional voting (e.g., Farber et al., 2007; Levitt, 1996; Mian et al., 2010). However, 
although members of Congress discussed fair value accounting and held a congressional hearing, 
they never voted on the issue during the financial crisis. To measure the politicians’ individual 
                                               
7  Note that the House of Representatives regularly has 435 members. However, one Representative died in August 
2008 (Stephanie Tubbs Jones). Her replacement (Marcia Fudge) did not join Congress before November 19, 2008. 
For consistency, we excluded both politicians from our analysis. 
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involvement in the fair value debate without any evidence from voting behavior, we identify their 
positioning by hand-collecting their public statements from a comprehensive review of publicly 
available documents and web resources (similar to Ramanna, 2008). We also capture implicit 
expressions of political will through the support of relevant legislative proposals.8 Sources 
include official websites (i.e., congressional records, individual members of Congress, 
congressional committees); press citations in U.S. newspapers and magazines (obtained from 
Factiva and LexisNexis); relevant legislative proposals in congressional archives; and the non-
profit, non-partisan research organization Vote Smart that collects and distributes information on 
U.S. politicians.9 Our search spans the time period from September 1, 2008, until April 30, 2009. 
To identify relevant documents, we use the internal search features provided by the 
website or database and search for the terms fair value/fair-value or mark to market/mark-to-
market. We consider a statement relevant if the politician comments on the topic of fair value 
accounting or if the media mentions a statement. We exclude all statements that refer to fair value 
accounting in a context different from accounting for financial instruments (e.g., agriculture). 
Two persons independently read each statement and identified the direction of the statement 
(positive vs. negative or neutral towards fair value accounting). 
Table 1 summarizes the frequency and type of all identified statements between 
September 2008 and April 2009. Panel A documents that we observe a total of 503 public 
                                               
8  Legislative proposals on fair value accounting predominantly include alternative legislative proposals that emerged 
before and during the Senate and House discussions about the EESA in late September/early October 2008. For 
example, Rep. Hensarling, leader of the Republican Study Committee, sponsored H.R. 7223, the “Free Market 
Protection Act of 2008”. The act was intended to “suspend the capital gains tax, schedule the government-sponsored 
enterprises for privatization, repeal the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act, and suspend mark-to-market 
accounting requirements […]”. 
9 Vote Smart data is available online at http://votesmart.org. Although Vote Smart data overlaps with information 
available via official websites and press citations, the data is especially useful to identify (a) historical statements 
of politicians that are no longer member of Congress and (b) statements that have been issued in media other than 
newspapers, e.g., radio or TV interviews. 
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statements with most of the statements coming from politicians’ speeches during congressional 
meetings or other events (118), press releases (111), and the public support of legislative 
initiatives such as bills or petitions (99). For 455 statements, we are able to unanimously define 
the direction (positive vs. negative or neutral), 308 of them coming from fall 2008 and 147 from 
March/April 2009. Almost a third of all 434 representatives in our sample participated in the fair 
value debate. 139 distinct representatives issued at least one statement on fair value accounting or 
supported a corresponding legislative proposal (Table 1, Panel B). The vast majority of the 139 
representatives (96.4%) expressed a negative opinion on fair value accounting in their statements. 
117 representatives did so in fall 2008 and 45 in March/April 2009. Only 4 representatives took a 
positive position towards fair value accounting at some time, and one representative issued 
multiple statements with different positions. 109 of the 135 politicians who issue some negative 
statements are Republicans, the remaining 26 are Democrats (Table 1, Panel C). 
The large number of statements around the voting on the EESA as documented in Figure 
1 supports our notion that fair value relaxations were discussed as a potential alternative to the 
bailout plan. Table 1, Panel D illustrates representatives’ choices in the September 29, 2008, and 
October 3, 2008, EESA votes. Among the 117 representatives who publicly opposed fair value 
accounting during this time period, 95 voted “nay” in the first vote (81.2%). Consistent with 
conservative ideology being associated with opposition against fair value accounting, the 
proportion is substantially greater than among other representatives (133 out of 316, 42%). 
Notably, 23 politicians with negative fair value statements switched their position when voting on 
the bailout bill on October 3, 2008; they supported the act only after the inclusion of the 
paragraph on fair value accounting. 
3.2. Measurement of Political Involvement in the Stock Option Debate 
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In contrast to the fair value debate, Representatives sponsored two bills (H.R. 1372 and 
H.R. 3574) and voted on one bill (H.R. 3574) that were both directly concerned with the 
accounting for employee stock options. Therefore, we can measure political involvement more 
directly and focus on Representatives’ support for the proposed legislation that sought to prevent 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board from requiring the expensing of employee stock 
options at fair value.  
Table 2 presents statistics for Representatives’ (co-)sponsoring of H.R. 1372 (i.e., the 
predecessor of H.R. 3574) and H.R. 3574, as well as Representatives’ final voting on H.R. 3574 
during the House session on July 20, 2004. All three events occurred during the 108th 
Congressional cycle which forms the basis for our sample selection. We exclude the five 
congressional districts where the elected Representatives changed during the 108th Congressional 
cycle. We obtain data on co-sponsoring from Fowler et al.’s website on congressional co-
sponsorship networks (http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/cosponsorship.html; see Fowler, 2006a, and 
Fowler 2006b, for a description of the data) and data on Congressional votes from Poole’s 
Voteview data website (http://voteview.com). Overall, 25.8 (30.5) percent of the 430 remaining 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives sponsored H.R. 1372 (H.R. 3574) The House 
passed H.R. 3574 in July 2004 by a vote of 308 to 111 (after excluding the replacements during 
the congressional cycle), see Table 2, Panel C. While relatively more Republican representatives 
supported the proposed legislations, both bills also received significant bipartisan support. 
However, Republican sponsorship of H.R. 3574 increased by only 2.2 percentage points 
compared to the initial H.R. 1372 bill. Democratic support increased by 7.3 percentage points or 
34.6 percent. This observation indicates that relatively more Democratic representatives got 
involved in the debate when the new proposal included the exceptions for top management 
compensation.  
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3.3. Basic Regression Model 
We follow the political sciences literature on congressional voting and use the following 
general logit model as our basic specification to investigate the relationship between politicians’ 
participation in the two accounting debates and their anti-government-intervention ideology as 
well as distinct special interest considerations: 
Prob(Public Involvementi = 1) = "#$% + $'Ideologyi + $(Special Interestsi +	∑$+Controls+ + ,- [1] 
The dependent variable Public Involvementi is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if representative i got actively involved in the accounting debate. For the analysis of the fair 
value debate, the variable takes a value of one if representative i issued at least one negative 
statement on fair value accounting during the entire sample period from September 2008 to April 
2009, and zero otherwise (we do not distinguish between positive or neutral statements in our 
coding of the dependent variable, because the number of politicians with non-negative statements 
is negligibly small; 5 out of 434 Congress members, see Table 1). For the analysis of the stock 
option debate, the variable takes the value of one if representative i (co-)sponsored at least one of 
the two bills (H.R. 1372 or H.R. 3574) or voted in favor of H.R. 3574 during the final House 
vote, and zero otherwise. 
To measure ideology in our basic model (equation [1]), we follow the political sciences 
literature and use the first dimension of the DW-Nominate score (Ideology) provided by Carroll 
et al. (http://voteview.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htm). They derive the score from 
politicians’ past roll call voting records in Congress. We use the scores with voting records 
through December 31, 2008 (December 31, 2004) for the fair value debate (the stock option 
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debate). The score increases in the strength of the positioning against government intervention in 
the economy, i.e., in the level of conservative ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 2011). That is, a 
score close to zero characterizes an ideologically moderate politician.  
To measure a politician’s tendency to cater to special interests, we focus on hard money 
campaign contributions received from political action committees (PACs) that are sponsored by 
private-sector entities that benefit from the accounting regulation.10 PACs are organizations that 
collect and pool campaign contributions from sponsoring institutions and use these funds to 
support or defeat specific candidates or regulatory processes. Although federal law limits the 
activities of PACs, PAC contributions are a widely used proxy for political connections of U.S. 
firms.11 Note that while campaign contributions reflect direct monetary flows from firms to 
politicians, we cannot interpret them as bribery to buy a specific political action (Stratmann, 
2002). Rather, the proxy stands for active relationships between politicians and corporations, and 
it reflects the relative presence of a firm in the political process. 
For our estimation of campaign contributions, we use the file of corporations that are 
sponsoring PACs in the 107th and the 110th congressional cycle provided by the Center for 
Responsive Politics (CRP, http://www.opensecrets.org). In our tests of equation (1), we use the 
amount of campaign contributions that a politician received from the financial services industry 
(excluding real estate firms) during the 110th congressional cycle as a proxy for political 
connections to firms with special interests in the fair value debate, all based on CRP’s industry 
classification. There is not only one specific industry that benefits from the regulation of stock 
                                               
10  Campaign contributions are a more direct measure of active relationships between corporations and politicians than 
is geographical proximity of a politician’s district to a firm’s headquarters (see e.g., Ansolabehere et al., 2002; 
Cooper et al., 2010; Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998; 2005).  
11  Recent studies include Akey (2015), Cooper et al. (2010), Correia (2014), Farber et al. (2007), Mian et al. (2010), 
and Ramanna (2008). 
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option accounting. Therefore, we use the amount of campaign contributions from firms that also 
issued a comment letter to the FASB expressing their opposition to the expensing of employee 
stock options as a proxy for special interest connections. The measures are relative to the sum of 
PAC contributions received from other firms. 
Control variables include measures for the personal background of the Representatives 
(congressional assignments, electoral margin, seniority, retirement, business background, 
previous accounting interest, voting on the EESA) and the potential special interests of the 
constituents in their congressional district (workforce in specific industries, GDP growth, bailout 
opposition, loan denial rates, employee stock option interest). We use this basic model to test our 
prediction that representatives who fair value acc are more likely to share beliefs against 
government intervention (i.e., are more ideologically conservative) and are more likely to be 
connected to the financial services industry (i.e., are more likely to cater to special interests). 
Appendix D includes a full description of all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics and Results 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of politicians’ characteristics and their behavior 
during the two accounting debates. Panel A presents statistics for ideology and special interest 
connections of politicians during the fair value debate. Panel B presents equivalent statistics for 
the stock option debate. Overall, politicians who are involved in the two debates and oppose fair 
value accounting or stock option expensing are far more conservative (e.g., with an average DW-
Nominate Ideology Score of 0.49 in the fair value debate and 0.25 in the stock option debate) than 
their peers (-0.06 and 0.08) and have closer ties to firms affected by the respective regulation 
(e.g., with an average percentage of PAC contributions from these firms of 23.6% vs.11.7% in 
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the fair value debate and of 4.2% vs. 2.7% in the stock option debate). These descriptive statistics 
strongly suggest that these Representatives maintain closer financial relationships with firms 
affected by the regulation than Representatives who are not publicly involved in the debates. 
Table 4 presents the results for the basic logit model (equation [1]). Panel A documents 
descriptive statistics for test variables and control variables. Panel B reports average marginal 
effects for a politician’s propensity to get publicly involved in the accounting debate. Consistent 
with our predictions, average marginal effects for conservative ideology, measured by the DW-
Nominate ideology score, and the proportion of contributions received from connected firms with 
special interests in the debate are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (two-sided). 
A 1-point change in a representative’s ideology is associated with an increase of 41.8 (22.3) 
percentage points in the likelihood of a politician opposing fair value accounting (stock option 
expensing). A one-standard-deviation change in the score is, therefore, attended by an increase in 
the likelihood of publicly opposing fair value accounting (stock option expensing) of 21.6 (11.0) 
percentage points. At the same time, an increase in the ratio of special interest PAC contributions 
by 1 percentage point is associated with a 0.2 (4.0) percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
a politician issuing a negative statement on fair value accounting (supporting legislation that 
opposes stock option expensing). A one-standard-deviation change in special interest PAC 
contributions increases the likelihood of a publicly opposing fair value accounting (stock option 
expensing) by 4.84 (11.2) percentage points.  
Control variables show the expected signs and, with the exception of Business 
Background and Change in GDP, behave similarly in the two settings. In both settings, seniority 
significantly decreases the propensity to become involved in an accounting debate. The level of 
significance varies across settings for the other control variables. Membership in the House 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, the latest 
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electoral margin in the congressional district, and a switch in the vote on the EESA bill are 
positively associated, closeness to retirement is negatively associated with active involvement in 
the fair value debate. Accounting interest and GDP growth are negatively associated with active 
involvement in the stock option debate 
With the exception of GDP growth during the stock option debate, marginal effects are 
not statistically significant for our measures of constituent interests. Overall, special interests by a 
politician’s constituents in the home district do not help explain political participation in an 
accounting debate. The economic consequences of both regulations that we study involve 
potential net transfers to firms and their managers, while transfers to households are, if at all, 
indirect. Therefore, compared to firms with special interests, there are relatively few incentives 
for constituents to exert pressure on their Representative. 
 
4. Intertemporal Variation in Political Involvement 
4.1. Approach to Identification 
The major concern about the above design is the potential overlap between a politician’s 
conservative ideology, contributions from the industry, and personal business or even accounting 
expertise. This overlap is the key obstacle to disentangling the effect of special interest 
considerations from a politician’s personal conviction driven by ideology, expertise or both. In 
particular, it is highly plausible that private-sector firms are directing their contributions to 
politicians that have expertise in this area of regulation (e.g., through congressional assignments 
or personal experience from a previous career), and that those expert politicians share a specific 
ideology. For example, representatives serving on the U.S. House Committee on Financial 
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Services receive, on average, more campaign contributions from the financial services industry 
than other members of Congress (e.g., Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). That is, a positive 
association between campaign contributions from the financial services industry and political 
actions of committee members does not necessarily indicate that representatives react primarily 
to special interest considerations. Members of the committee might simply issue more statements 
as part of their congressional assignment, e.g., because of greater familiarity with industry-
specific issues or because of greater expertise. Although our empirical specification includes 
variables to control for the effect of committee membership, expertise, and seniority, we cannot 
rule out that part of the effect is still captured by the error term, thus systematically biasing our 
coefficient estimates.  
To address this identification problem, we exploit variation in the political environment of 
and the timing of politicians’ participation in the two accounting debates over time. While the 
potential benefits for connected firms and, thus, special interests remain relatively constant 
during the course of the debates, the role of ideology varies. The fair value debate is tied to bank 
bail-outs only during its early phase in fall 2008, particularly encouraging the involvement of 
conservative politicians who oppose these government interventions. The stock option debate is 
tied to restrictions of top management compensation only during its later phase in 2004, 
particularly encouraging the involvement of liberal politicians who support these government 
interventions. Therefore, we use (1) the variation in the timing of politicians’ statements and, 
thus, the role of ideology at the time of their statement, and (2) the cross-sectional variation in 
politicians’ ideological stance towards the government interventions in our second analysis. 
As discussed before (section 2.2.) and as illustrated in Figure 1, political participation in 
the fair value debate peaked at two distinct points in time: in September/October 2008 as part of 
the general debate about the EESA, and in March/April 2009 as part of the more specific debate 
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about relaxations of specific fair value accounting rules in the FASB’s staff positions (FSP FAS 
157-4, FSP FAS 115-2, and FSP FAS 124-2). If politicians’ actions can be explained simply by 
their expertise, there is no plausible reason for any specific time pattern of their involvement in 
the debate. However, if politicians’ participation in the fair value debate stems from ideological 
beliefs against government interventions, we should observe that more conservative politicians 
were more likely to participate in the fall debate than in the spring debate. Only in fall 2008 do 
we have the direct link from fair value accounting to a conservative agenda when politicians 
viewed the relaxation of fair value rules as an alternative to government intervention through 
bank bailouts. In March/April 2009, government bailouts were no longer at the center of the 
accounting debate but had long been decided upon. In addition, politicians’ incentives to signal 
their ideological preferences towards their voter base were potentially larger in fall 2008 right 
before the November congressional elections. Put differently, if ideology explains the 
involvement of politicians in the debate, beyond special interest connections, the level of 
conservative ideology should be more pronounced for participants in the October 2008 debate 
than for participants in March/April 2009. Since special interests are held relatively constant over 
time, a change in the role of ideology cannot stem from an overlap with political connections. 
Similarly, political participation in the debate about the expensing of employee stock 
options peaked at two points in time. Only the second bill (H.R. 3574) distinguished between top-
management compensation and the compensation of other employees and, by explicitly allowing 
the expensing of stock options for the five highest-paid executives, provided an incentive for 
firms to restrict the compensation of these top-level executives. If politicians’ participation in the 
debate stems from ideological beliefs that government should intervene to restrict top 
management compensation, rather than from political connections to private-sector firms that 
would incur costs from the expensing, we would only see these liberal politicians joining the 
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debate around the adoption of H.R. 3574. In contrast, special interests of private-sector firms 
would fail to explain differences in the level of participation of liberal politicians over the course 
of the debate. 
4.2. Research Design 
To test these predictions, we create panel data sets for both settings with two observations 
for each representative; i.e., we allow for a variation in political involvement over time. For 
members of the 110th Congress that debated on fair value accounting, the first observation is from 
fall 2008, and the second observation from March/April 2009. For members of the 108th 
Congress that debated on stock option expensing, the first observation is from the sponsorship of 
H.R. 1372, and the second observation from H.R. 3574. We use the panel data to re-estimate the 
previous model and now include interaction terms between the timing of the Political 
Involvement and our measures for Ideology and Special Interests. To better interpret the 
interaction terms, we switch from the logit model to a conventional OLS design where we cluster 
standard errors by representative:12 
Prob(Public Involvementit = 1) 	=	"($% + $'Ideologyi +	$(Ideology/ 	× 	Timing Indicatort +	$1Special Interests/ + 	$2Special Interests	/ × 	Timing Indicatort	+	∑$+Controls+ + ,) [2] 
                                               
12  We also re-estimate the specification based on a logit model and compare the average marginal effects for Ideology 
and Special Interests for statements issued in fall 2008 and statements issued in March/April 2009. The results are 
virtually unchanged with similar levels of significance and magnitude of effects. 
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If ideology contributes to politicians’ public involvement in the accounting debates, we 
should expect variation in the level of ideology over time, i.e., a significant coefficient for β2. We 
continue to measure Ideology by the DW-Nominate ideology score. However, in our tests of 
equation [2], we replace our special interest variable by more specific proxies for the two 
settings. 
For the fair value setting, we use the potential reporting benefits from the April 2009 
accounting relaxations for the banks that a politician received campaign contributions from. To 
link our data on campaign contributions with the firm-specific proxies, we start with a sample of 
307 U.S. bank holding companies (BHC) that filed a FR Y-9C report for financial years 2008 and 
2009 with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-
institution-reports/bhc-data).13 We match the names of the BHCs with our CRP file, thereby 
tracking individual corporations in the CRP file to the ultimate parent BHC in the Chicago Fed 
file. We exclude donations from BHC subsidiaries with activities only in the real estate business 
because different accounting rules apply for this sub-sector. Overall, we identify 52 distinct 
BHCs that sponsored at least one PAC during the 110th congressional cycle14 and 330 distinct 
Representatives who received campaign contributions from at least one of these institutions. 
We construct three additional measures to capture the reporting benefits. First, we 
calculate the average difference between the amortized cost and the fair value of non-guaranteed 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) classified as available-for-sale scaled by the amount of total 
                                               
13  Specifically, we include all bank holding companies that (1) are registered with the SEC, or (2) are subject to 
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. By focusing on listed bank holding companies, our 
sample is characterized by larger banks, which are more likely to be politically active. In addition, these banks 
typically have a greater percentage of assets measured at fair value and have higher levels of securitization 
(especially in mortgage-backed securities). 
14  The remaining committees primarily relate to industry associations and investment banks that did not report to the 
Federal Reserve System before 2008. 
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assets across all four reporting quarters during the calendar year 2008 (Measurement Difference 
Non-guaranteed MBS AfS, source: Chicago Fed, Form FR Y-9C, (BHCK1711 + BHCK1735 – 
(BHCK1712 + BHCK1736)) / BHCK2170). Second, we calculate the change in the ratio of Level 
2 assets to Level 3 assets between the end of the fourth quarter 2008 and the end of the first 
quarter 2009 (Decrease in Ratio of L2/L3-FV-Assets Q408-Q109, source: Chicago Fed, Form FR 
Y-9C, AOL2Q / AUL3Q). The change in the ratio proxies for the firm’s ability to take advantage 
of relaxed restrictions to Level 3 valuations after the adoption of FSP FAS 157-4. Third, as an 
alternative to the two accounting-based proxies, we follow Bhat et al. (2011) and use the equity 
market reaction to the announcement of the upcoming regulation at the congressional hearing on 
March 12, 2009, as a proxy for investor perceptions of the benefits of relaxed fair value rules 
(CAR (12 March 2009)). For each firm, we compute the three-day cumulative abnormal return 
centered on the event date. To measure expected returns, we use a market model based on the 
S&P 500 index that estimates beta over the entire calendar year 2008 on a daily basis (source: 
CRSP).  For all three additional variables, it is possible that a politician receives PAC 
contributions from more than one bank. In this case, we use the maximum value from the 
subsample of all contributing banks because it is most plausible that the bank that expects the 
greatest potential benefit from the regulation is most actively lobbying. 
Similar to our analysis of the fair value debate, we develop two additional proxies to 
capture politicians’ special interest connections during the stock option debate. First, we identify 
all companies and associations that were a member of the International Employee Stock Option 
Coalition (IESOC), a group of individuals, trade associations and companies that, according to 
the coalition's website, “represent a diverse range of industries, including high-tech, 
manufacturing and service companies, in the United States and abroad”. The coalition was 
heavily involved in lobbying activities against the expensing of stock options in 2003-04 
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(Leonhardt, 2002). We use the internet web archive (http://web.archive.org) to identify members 
based on historical snapshots of the coalition’s website. We manually match all IESOC members 
with registered PACs. IESOC PAC Contributions captures the amount of campaign contributions 
from IESOC members.  
Second, we use the implied stock option expense (net of tax) that connected firms would 
have to pay under the FASB’s 2003 proposal to measure stock option expense at fair value. The 
variable is based on data from Farber et al. (2007), who hand-collected these estimates for a 
sample of 400 firms with active PACs from the pro forma footnote disclosures of stock option 
expense in the 2003 10-K filings.15 Although it is possible that a politician receives PAC 
contributions from more than one company in the sample, we again use the accounting data of the 
firm that contributed the highest amount to a politician’s PAC because this firm represent the 
potentially strongest political connection.  
4.3. Changes in Political Involvement during the Fair Value Debate 
Figure 1 plots the number of individual politicians for whom we observe a public 
statement on fair value accounting for every week between January 2008 and December 2009. 
Consistent with our illustration of institutional events (see section 2.2.), the distribution confirms 
that politicians’ statements are highly clustered in fall 2008 and spring 2009. In particular, most 
statements occur during the time of the discussion about the EESA and the SEC/FASB 
Clarifications in September/October 2008, the congressional hearing on mark-to-market 
accounting in March 2009, and the following FASB guidance in April 2009. The timing of the 
statements thus supports our identification strategy outlined in section 4.1. Figure 2 illustrates the 
geographic distribution of Republican and Democratic representatives with and without negative 
                                               
15 We are grateful to David B. Farber, Marilyn F. Johnson, and Kathy R. Petroni for providing us with the raw data. 
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statements on fair value accounting. It appears that representatives with negative statements are 
not per se located in congressional districts close to major U.S. financial centers.  
Our sample includes observations from all 434 members of the House in fall 2008 and 
from the 380 members who are re-elected in November 2008 and continue to be members of the 
House in March/April 2009 (Table 5, Panel A). Table 5, Panel B documents descriptive statistics 
for all test and control variables. Table 7, Panel A shows simple univariate tests to illustrate the 
different incentives over time. While representatives who participate in the debate are more 
conservative than their peers during both periods, participating representatives are relatively less 
conservative in March/April 2009 than in fall 2008 (the difference in the score is -0.146 with a 
two-sided p-value of 4.9%, see Panel A). Accordingly, the difference in political ideology 
between participating and non-participating representatives decreases by 0.227 (p-value = 1.4%). 
In contrast, the representatives’ reliance on PAC contributions from the financial sector is 
significantly greater for those who participate in the fair value debate in March/April 2009 
(38.7% vs. 20.9% in fall 2008, p-value = 0.7%, see Panel A). Although the proportion of 
financial sector PAC contributions is greater for participating representatives already in fall 2008 
(20.9% vs. 13.4% for non-participating peers, p-value = 0.4%), the difference in the proportion 
increases by 18.5 percentage points in March/April 2009 (p-value = 1.3%). The table also show 
that those politicians who join the debate in March or April, i.e., did not participate in the fall 
debate, are significantly less conservative (DW-Nominate score of 0.00 compared to 0.54 for 
politicians who only participated in fall, p-value < 0.1%). Overall, the univariate tests provide 
results consistent with our predicted time pattern of representatives’ incentives to participate in 
the debate. The early debate around Congress’ EESA votes is dominated by ideologically more 
conservative representatives, consistent with relaxation of fair value accounting being viewed as 
an alternative to government bailouts. The later debate about the precise design of the new fair 
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value rules is dominated by politicians who are more closely connected to the financial services 
industry, i.e., special interests continue to play a role, and less so by ideological motives. 
Table 8 shows the estimation results of the panel regression (equation [2]). Panel A 
presents the results for the four different specifications of our regression model in the fair value 
setting where we use the DW-Nominate Ideology Score as our proxy for ideology and vary the 
proxy for special interest pressure. In column (1), we use the proportion of PAC contributions 
from the financial sector (the Financial sector PAC contributions [%PAC] variable from equation 
[1]) as our proxy for special interest pressure and vary the proxy for a representative’s political 
ideology. In columns (2) through (4), we are using the more precise measures that are supposed 
to capture the specific benefits from the April 2009 regulation for a politician’s connected firms 
(see above, section 4.2); therefore, we need to further restrict the sample to those representatives 
who are connected to BHCs for which sufficient accounting data is available from our data 
sources (see Table 5, Panel A for the sample selection). Overall, the results support our 
predictions. Results for Ideology and its interaction with the March/April 2009 dummy are 
largely unaffected by the variation in the Special Interest definition. The DW-Nominate score is 
positively associated with political involvement in the fair value debate throughout all 
specifications (with coefficient estimates between 0.508 and 0.550, all significant at the 1% 
level). The association is significantly weaker for the March/April period (with coefficient 
estimates for the interaction term between -0.362 and -0.410, all significant at the 1% level). The 
role of special interests changes in the opposite direction. We find a significantly greater 
association between special interests and public involvement in the debate during the 
March/April period (with coefficient estimates for the interaction term between 0.003 and 0.825, 
all significant at the 5% or 1% level). Results for the control variables are similar to the base 
model in Table 3 (especially constituent interests still fail to explain the political involvement). 
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We repeat the analyses for the subsample of the 106 politicians who only participated 
during one period (either in fall 2008 or in spring 2009). We show the results in columns (5) 
through (8). The results behave similarly and undermine the difference in the role of ideology 
over time. The base coefficient for Special Interests has a negative sign in these specifications. 
The base coefficient relates to the fall 2008 period where an overlap between ideological motives 
and special interests is more plausible. 
4.4. Changes in Political Involvement during the Stock Option Debate 
Our sample includes observations from all 435 members of the House during the 108th 
Congressional cycle. We exclude five congressional districts for which the elected 
Representatives changed during the 108th Congressional cycle and another two congressional 
districts for which relevant control variables are not available (Table 6, Panel A). Table 6, Panel 
B documents descriptive statistics for all test and control variables. Figure 3 illustrates the 
geographic distribution of Republican and Democratic representatives that opposed the expensing 
of stock options by (co-)sponsoring either H.R. 1372 (the Broad-Based Stock Option Plan 
Transparency Act) or H.R. 3574 (the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act), or both. As with the 
fair value debate, the geographic distribution suggests that representatives who support 
legislation against stock option expensing are not per se located in congressional districts with a 
high concentration of high-technology firms, i.e., constituent interests. 
Univariate tests in Table 7, Panel B illustrate the differences in incentives in sponsoring 
H.R. 1372 versus H.R. 3574. It appears that representatives who sponsor legislation against the 
expensing of stock options are more conservative than their peers with only slight differences 
between both bills (the difference in the score is -0.050, but insignificant). The table also shows 
that new co-sponsors of H.R. 3574, who did not support H.R. 1372 before, are significantly more 
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liberal (DW-Nominate score of 0.19 compared to 0.41, p-value < 1%). At the same time, 
although the level of PAC contributions from firms and associations that opposed the expensing 
of stock options is significantly greater for those representatives who sponsored legislation 
against stock option expensing, representatives supporting either H.R. 1372 or H.R. 3574 have 
about the same level of connections with interested parties from the private sector. Overall, the 
univariate tests suggest that special interests alone are unlikely to explain representatives’ 
increased support for legislation against the expensing of stock options. Instead, the statistics are 
consistent with ideology explaining political involvement in accounting standard-setting (i.e., the 
liberal support for a government intervention to limit excessive executive compensation, see 
section 2.3.). 
Table 8 Panel B presents the estimation results of the panel regression (equation [2]) for 
the three different specifications of our regression model in the stock option setting. Columns (1) 
through (3) report the results for the full sample of representatives, while columns (4) through (6) 
present the results for the subsample of politicians who only sponsored one bill (either H.R. 1372 
or H.R. 3574). We again use the DW-Nominate Ideology Score as our proxy for ideology and 
vary the proxy for special interest pressure. The first column uses the proportion of PAC 
contributions from entities that opposed stock option expensing in a comment letter to the FASB 
(in response to FASB issues No. 1101-001, No. 1102-001, and No. 1102-100, Comment Letter 
Opposition Pac Contributions [%PAC]) as our proxy for special interest connections. The second 
column uses PAC contributions from members of the International Employee Stock Option 
Coalition (IESOC PAC Contributions [%PAC]). The IESOC has the goal to promote and avoid 
the regulation of stock option. The third column uses the maximum implied total stock option 
expenses (net of tax) of a connected firm under the 2003 FASB proposal, scaled by total assets. 
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The proxy captures the specific reporting benefits from avoiding the mandatory expensing of 
stock options for connected firms (see above, section 4.2). 
Overall, the results support our predictions. The DW-Nominate score (Ideology) and all 
three proxies for Special Interests are significantly positively associated with representatives’ 
public opposition against the expensing of stock options (columns (1) through (3)). While we fail 
to find significant effects for Ideology and its interaction with support for H.R. 3574 in the full 
sample, the interaction is significantly negative when we focus on new co-sponsors of H.R. 3574, 
who did not support H.R. 1372 before (columns (4) through (6)), i.e., in the subsample where the 
plausible role of ideology is greatest. At the same time, we do not find any significant effect for 
the interaction between the level of connections with interested parties and support for H.R. 3574, 
neither in the full sample nor in the subsample of representatives who only supported one 
legislation. Overall, the results undermine the difference in role of ideology in shaping 
representative’s opposition against stock option expensing. Even though overall support for 
legislation against the expensing of stock options is, on average, associated with more 
conservative ideology and stronger connections to special interest groups, the new supporters of 
the latter bill differ from the previous ones in the level of political ideology (i.e., they are 
significantly more liberal). 
 
5. Content Analysis of Political Statements 
5.1. Politicians’ Statements during the Fair Value Debate 
Ideology and Special Interests of Republicans’ Statements 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972549 
 36 
Descriptive statistics show that the largest proportion of representatives who participate in 
the fair value debate comes from the House Republican Conference (see also Figures 1 and 2). 
More precisely, 104 out of the 117 representatives for whom we observe at least one statement 
are Republicans; 104 out of the 198 Republicans in the House join the debate but only 13 out of 
the 236 Democrats do so. One important concern with our results is, therefore, that it is simply 
the party affiliation driving our results (and plausibly associated with both ideology and special 
interest pressure). To give further meaning to our findings, we examine the variation within the 
group of Republican representatives. Table 9, Panel A documents that these findings hold when 
we restrict our sample to Republicans. On average, Republican representatives who publicly 
oppose fair value accounting score higher on the DW-Nominate Ideology Score (i.e., are more 
conservative; 0.495 vs. 0.393, p-value < 0.1%) and receive a higher proportion of campaign 
contributions from the financial services industry (21.4% vs. 13.2%, p-value < 5%). Again, a 
politician’s ideology and the source of campaign contributions are plausibly correlated. To 
further corroborate our findings and disentangle the special interest explanation from the 
ideology explanation, we analyze the content and the timing of the statements for consistency 
with these explanations. 
Context and Content of the Fair Value Statements 
Manual coding and classification of all statements in our sample reveal that four types of 
context and content prevail. These types are non-mutually exclusive: (1) the suspension of fair 
value accounting is proposed in the context of a statement that is directed against government 
intervention and favors market-based solutions to the financial crisis (Calls for ‘market-based 
solutions’); (2) the suspension of fair value accounting is proposed as one specific alternative to a 
government bailout (Calls for ‘bailout alternatives’); (3) the suspension of fair value accounting 
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is part of a longer list of alternative policy proposals that are all supposed to address the financial 
crisis (Calls for other alternative proposals); (4) the statement directly addresses some precise 
weakness of fair value accounting, e.g., the alleged procyclicality (Focus on specific weakness of 
fair value accounting). Appendix E provides the exact definitions for each classification and 
presents representative examples of statements. 
For each type of statement, we compare ideology (Table 9, Panel B) and special interest 
pressure (Table 9, Panel C) of the representatives. The findings show that statements of type (1), 
(2), or (3), on average, come from more conservative Republicans (with the difference being 
significant at the 1% or 5% level), whereas representatives who issue a statement of type (4) do 
not significantly differ in their ideology from their peers. This latter group of representatives, 
however, receives significantly more campaign contributions from the financial services industry 
(40.7% vs. 17.9%, parametric and non-parametric p-value < 1%). Campaign contributions do not 
significantly differ for representatives who issue any other type of statement. 
Overall, the content analysis shows a pattern of representatives’ statements that is largely 
consistent with our predictions. There are mainly two distinct groups of representatives who 
publicly oppose fair value accounting. The first group comprises most conservative politicians 
who strongly oppose the bailouts included in the EESA from October 2008. These politicians’ 
arguments against fair value accounting do not emphasize any particular accounting consequence 
but, in a bigger picture, describe the change in accounting rules as one alternative means to direct 
government intervention; i.e., they frame the view on fair value accounting around a broader 
public policy issue. Their arguments are non-technical in nature. The second group comprises 
politicians who have the strongest incentives to cater to the special interests of the financial 
services industry. These politicians focus their statements right on the issue of fair value 
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accounting and do not put the accounting issue into broader context. They argue more 
technically, and their statements refer to potentially detrimental effects of fair value accounting. 
Dynamics of the Debate 
In our investigation of the timing of the statements, we distinguish between four key 
periods during which Republican representatives initially joined the debate: (1) any day before 
the first congressional bailout vote on September 29, 2008; (2) the day of the bailout vote, i.e., 
September 29, 2008; (3) the days immediately after the first bailout vote when the SEC and the 
FASB issued the joint press release announcing clarifications on the application of fair value 
accounting and the optional suspension of mark-to-market accounting was included in the final 
EESA bill (see Appendix B.2 and C), i.e., September 30 and October 1, 2008; and (4) any day 
after October 1, 2008. Figure 4 illustrates differences in ideology and special interests based on 
the timing of the representatives’ initial statement and presents corresponding univariate tests. It 
appears that early participants (i.e., representatives who issued their first statement on fair value 
accounting before the first bailout vote) are, on average, more conservative than representatives 
who joined the debate only after the first bailout voting. The observation is consistent with the 
notion that ideologically motivated politicians are more likely to express their opposition against 
fair value accounting early during the discussion about the ideologically controversial EESA, but 
are less likely to do so after responsive action by both the SEC and the FASB and after Congress 
decided about the bailouts and included the fair value clause in the second version of the bill. 
At the same time, we observe significant differences in special interest connections 
between politicians who became active very early in the debate, when the issue was put on the 
agenda (i.e., before September 29, 2008), and politicians who became active only on or 
immediately after the first bailout vote. Special interest connections are particularly strong for the 
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early agenda-setters and for the participants in the technical discussion during the later phase of 
the debate. Overall, the different patterns of timing for ideologically conservative representatives 
and for those who are most closely connected to the financial services industry are again 
consistent with ideology and special interests being two distinct explanations of politicians’ 
involvement in the fair value debate. 
5.2. Politicians’ Statements during the Stock Option Debate 
To further corroborate our findings and to illustrate the distinction between ideology- and 
special interest-related incentives to participate in the stock option debate, we analyze the content 
of representatives’ statements on stock option accounting during congressional discussions. 
Overall, the House of Representatives held five discussions on stock options accounting between 
2002 and 2004; four in subcommittee hearings and one in the full House debate before the voting 
on the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act (H.R. 3574). An initial manual inspection of the 
electronic transcripts reveals three major categories of arguments: (1) ideology-related arguments 
(i.e., on Excessive Executive Compensation; Wealth Participation (of rank-and-file employees); 
(Corporate) Scandal); (2) special interest-related arguments (Hightech Industry; Recruiting 
talent); and (3) technical arguments (on Earnings per share; and Method/concept). While the first 
two categories can conceptually be clearly linked to more ideology- or special interest-oriented 
motivations, the use of more technical arguments could be linked to different factors, including a 
politician’s special interest connections or personal expertise. Due to the similar structure of the 
empirical material (i.e., excerpts from hearings), we apply a formalized content-analysis approach 
and capture individual representatives’ references to specific argument categories by searching 
for related keywords and terms. Appendix F provides the list of search terms that we use for each 
argument type as well as representative examples of statements. 
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In general, politicians participating in the hearings (mostly members of the relevant 
subcommittee) have more special interest links (consistent with their interests and professional 
assignment in Congress), but do not differ significantly in their ideology (consistent with general 
appointment policy); see Table 10, Panel A. For each argument category, we compare 
representatives’ ideology (Table 10, Panel B) and the level of special interest connections (Table 
10, Panel C). The statistics present a clear picture and support the findings of our previous 
analyses. While special interest-related and technical arguments are more frequently used by 
politicians with stronger special interest links, ideology-related arguments on excessive executive 
compensation, possible adverse effects on wealth participation of rank-and-file employees, and 
(corporate) scandals are more likely to be brought forward into the debate by more liberal 
politicians. These patterns suggest that while special interest-related considerations are relevant 
to explain political involvement in the stock option debate, ideology-related considerations 
clearly found their way into the debate and are likely to explain politician's positioning beyond 
special interests.  
 
6. Robustness Tests 
Alternative Measures for Ideology 
Although the DW-Nominate score is the most common measure of political ideology 
(e.g., Mian et al., 2010), we test four alternative measures to proxy for representatives’ 
conservative (i.e., anti-interventionist) ideology. We use these alternative measures in our tests of 
equation [2]. First, we use an ideology score provided by the conservative and libertarian 
advocacy group FreedomWorks (http://www.freedomworks.org) that particularly lobbies against 
government intervention in the economy. We use the average of all available FreedomWorks 
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scores for an individual representative over the calendar years 2005 until 2008 for the fair value 
debate and the score for 2005 for the analysis of the stock option debate (scores are not available 
for earlier years). Second, we use an alternative ideology score based on campaign contributions 
(Campaign Finance Ideology Score or CFscore) developed by Bonica (2013, 2014; 
https://data.stanford.edu/DIME). The underlying idea is that contributors prefer ideologically 
proximate candidates and, ceteris paribus, distribute funds based on their evaluations of candidate 
ideology. Third, for the fair value setting we also identify representatives who later received 
explicit support from the Tea Party movement, a conservative political movement that was 
formed in 2009 largely in opposition to the government bailouts and subsidies that were part of, 
among others, the EESA of 2008. Fourth, within the same context, we identify all representatives 
who were member of the Republican Study Committee during the 109th, 110th, or 111th 
congressional cycle (Republican Study Committee). The Study Committee is a caucus of the 
Republican Party in the House of Representatives, the members of which define themselves as 
most conservative.16 Results (untabulated) are virtually identical to those presented in Table 8. 
Separate Estimation for Different Time Windows/Legislative Proposals 
To assess the robustness of our pooled regression specification (equation [2]), we also 
estimate separate cross-sectional regressions for the propensity of representatives’ statements for 
the two different points in time in both debates. The approach also helps overcome the different 
role of our control variables over time. We test for the difference in coefficients. In untabulated 
results, we find that representatives' conservative ideology helps explain participation in the fall 
2008 fair value debate and, to a lesser extent, in the March/April 2009 debate. Similarly, while 
                                               
16  We also re-estimated our analysis defining ideology simply along political party lines and use an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if a representative is a member of the Republican Party, and zero otherwise. We find 
virtually the same results. 
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connections to special interests help explain the sponsorship of both, H.R. 1372 and H.R. 3574, 
representatives' conservative ideology is significantly less likely to explain representatives' 
sponsorship of the second stock option bill (H.R. 3574). Overall, the alternative cross-sectional 
specifications corroborate the findings of the pooled regression specification reported in Table 8. 
Professional Assignments and Statements in March/April 2009 
A potential concern is that the above results for special interests during the fair value 
debate are potentially affected by representatives’ professional assignments in Congress, 
especially since a significant proportion of representatives' statement on fair value accounting in 
March/April 2009 is related to the hearing on mark-to-market accounting in the Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises. Although we control for 
committee membership in all our estimation models, inferences can still be biased by the overlap 
in professional assignments, regulatory activity, and special interest connections. To address this 
issue, we analyze differences in the impact of ideology and special interests on the likelihood to 
participate in the fair value debate across members and non-members of the House Financial 
Services committee. We re-estimate the baseline model [1] for statements in March/April 2009 
only and add interactions of ideology and special interests with an indicator variable that is equal 
to one if the representative is a member of the House Financial Services Committee, and zero 
otherwise. Results (untabulated) suggest that our previous finding on the importance of potential 
reporting benefits for connected firms is not driven simply by an overlap of special interest 
connections and professional assignments. In fact, we find that the association between special 
interests and negative statements on fair value accounting is particularly strong within the group 
of committee members. 
Interests of Major vs. Minor Financial Institutions 
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By definition, our measures of special interest pressure in the fair value debate potentially 
overweighs contributions from major financial institutions (e.g., SIFIs and TARP recipients), as 
these are more likely to (1) support a broader range of politicians, (2) give larger amounts, and 
(3) sponsor a specific PAC. This definition introduces two sources of potential bias to our 
analyses. First, our regression model potentially overestimates the effect of special interests on 
politicians’ likelihood to become involved in accounting standard-setting if politicians with 
special interest connections supported TARP and the EESA in the first place and, thus, have a 
genuine interest in the programs’ success. Therefore, these politicians could have focused on 
supporting systemically important financial institutions even in the absence of any campaign 
contributions. Second, the model potentially underestimates special interest pressure from smaller 
bank holding companies and commercial banks. Importantly, this might introduce a bias to our 
coefficient estimate for ideology if politicians’ ideology is correlated with the interests of smaller 
financial institutions and these interests do not overlap with the ones of major financial 
institutions.  
To alleviate these concerns, we re-estimate the baseline model [1] and introduce separate 
covariates for campaign contributions received from major and minor financial institutions. We 
identify major financial institutions based on the list of systemically important financial 
institutions as defined by the Financial Stability Board on November 4, 2011 
(http://www.fsb.org/2011/11/r_111104bb/), and the list of participants in the April/May 2009 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
2009). Results (untabulated) show that our inferences remain the same even when differentiating 
between political connections to major and minor financial institutions.  
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972549 
 44 
6. Conclusion 
The involvement of U.S. politicians in standard setting debates can be unusually intense. 
This paper examines the motivations for the political involvement in the accounting debate. In 
particular, we address the distinct roles of ideology and special interest pressure. Accounting 
regulation has economic and social consequences that introduce costs and benefits for firms and 
individuals. Politicians tend to have ideological views on many of these consequences. At the 
same time, affected parties have incentives to exploit their political connections to maximize their 
benefit from the regulation. To overcome the endogeneity concerns that arise from the overlap 
between a politician’s ideological beliefs and political connections to special interests, we study 
two settings where the role of ideology changes during the debate. During the fair value debate, 
ideological views on bank bail-outs dominated during the early period and less so at a later stage. 
During the stock option debate, ideological views on government interventions to restrict 
excessive management compensation dominated during the later period and less so at an earlier 
stage. 
In both settings, we find evidence that ideology explains a politician’s stance on the 
technical accounting issue and the public involvement in accounting regulation, beyond special 
interest pressure. Put differently, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those 
points when the public debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation 
(i.e., bank bail-outs and top-management compensation). Once the debates focus on more 
technical issues, political connections to special interests remain the most dominant force. 
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Excerpt from a Letter of 65 Members of the Congress to SEC chairman Christopher Cox 
calling for the immediate suspension of mark-to-market accounting (September 30, 2008) 
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Excerpt from a Letter of 40 Members of Congress to the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
expressing Opposition against the Expensing of Employee Stock Options (January 30, 2003) 
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APPENDIX B 
Selected Transcripts of Politicians’ Public Statements 
 
APPENDIX B.1 – Excerpt from the Hearing on “Mark-to-Market Accounting: Practices and Implications” 
On March 12, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Entities hold a hearing on “Mark-to-Market Accounting: Practices and Implications”. The 
following is an excerpt from an exchange between Gary L. Ackerman, representative from New York and member of 
the committee, Robert H. Herz, then-Chairman of the FASB, and James L. Kroeker, then-Acting Chief Accountant 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (cited from U.S. House, 2009): 
Mr. ACKERMAN. I think what the chairman said is if you do not act, we will. The timeframe that you are 
starting out with, thinking you have the luxury of that much space is not acceptable, I do not believe, to the 
members of this committee on either side of the aisle. If you are going to act, and we have to respond to what 
you are going to do, you have to get back real quick and let us know. So maybe you want to start the answer 
again?  
Mr. HERZ. Okay, I have heard you, I have heard you very clearly. We will go back, and we will consider 
exactly how. 
Mr. ACKERMAN. Can you do this whole thing in the 3 weeks that was referenced before?  
Mr. HERZ. We probably could.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. Will you do this within 3 weeks?  
Mr. HERZ. I have to talk to the other members of my board.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. When will you talk to them?  
Mr. HERZ. I will talk to them when I get back tonight.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. Tonight?  
Mr. HERZ. Yes.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Kroeker, with the right cooperation between the two of you, can you do this in 3 
weeks?  
Mr. KROEKER. We can absolutely work with the FASB in that timeframe.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. Within that timeframe?  
Mr. KROEKER. We expect within that timeframe and we, as I said in my testimony, we expect action within 
weeks, not months. The Commission, the staff, my staff stands ready to assist the Commission in any way 
possible if we do not see that action.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. So if the press wanted to report accurately, we could have this fixed in 3 weeks?  
Mr. HERZ. We could have the guidance in 3 weeks, whether it would fix things is another question. I hope it 
will.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. I am not talking about the result out in the street, but I am talking about fixing the 
problem.  
Mr. HERZ. Yes.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. In terms of what we all have been talking about.  
Mr. HERZ. Yes.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. That can be done in three - it will be done in 3 weeks, can and will?  
Mr. HERZ. Yes.  
Mr. ACKERMAN. Can and will?  
Mr. KROEKER. Yes.  
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
APPENDIX B.2 – Interview with Rep. John Boehner, House Minority Leader 
On Thursday, October 2, 2008, the day before the House’s second EESA vote, and three days after the first ESSA 
vote, John Boehner, then-Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, was interviewed by Neil Cavuto. The 
interview was televised on Fox News (cited from http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/10/02/john-boehner-on-
whether-rescue-bill-will-pass.html). 
Mr. CAVUTO: But, I mean, if it does go into the weekend, could we read into that that this thing is teetering? 
Mr. BOEHNER: Well, Neil, I don't -- I don't think that's going to be the case. Listen, House Republicans 
stopped this bill twice. I stopped it a week ago Thursday at the White House, and the bill got better on behalf 
of American taxpayers. And, while I wanted the bill to pass on Monday, most of my Republican colleagues 
voted no, and the bill went down. And the bill has gotten better. 
We would not have had the change from the SEC and FASB on mark-to-market clarification last night, I don't 
believe, unless this bill had gone down on Monday. And, clearly, the language increasing the FDIC insurance 
limit wouldn't be in there, even though we called for it to be included last weekend. 
Mr. CAVUTO: Got you. 
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APPENDIX C.1 
Timeline of Key Events of the Fair Value Debate in 2008-09 
 
Date Event 
July 9, 2008 SEC hosts roundtable on mark-to-market accounting. Participating commercial banks question the relevance of mark-to-market 
measurements when markets are illiquid and prices do not reflect the company's ultimate cash flow expectations. In addition, preparers 
and auditors express concerns that SFAS 157 lacks sufficient application guidance. Panelists also discuss difficulties with determining 
when declines in fair value estimates are considered other-than-temporary (see SEC, 2008). 
September 29, 2008 First vote in the U.S. House of Representatives on the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA). Several members of the U.S. 
Congress publicly oppose mark-to-market accounting regulations and argue for urgent changes in accounting rules. 
September 30, 2008 65 members of the Congress of the United States issue a letter to SEC chairman Christopher Cox calling for the immediate suspension 
of mark-to-market accounting (see Appendix A). 
September 30, 2008 Faced with congressional pressure to suspend fair value accounting, the SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and the FASB issue a joint 
press release with clarifications on the application of fair value accounting “to help preparers, auditors, and investors address fair value 
measurement questions that have been cited as most urgent in the current environment.” 
 October 3, 3008 After a second House voting, the EESA of 2008 is signed into law. Section 133 of the Act requires the SEC (in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) to conduct a study on ‘mark-to-market’ 
accounting. 
October 10, 2008 FASB issues FSP FAS157-3 (“Determining the Fair Value of a Financial Asset When the Market for That Asset is Not Active”), which 
attempts to provide additional guidance regarding the application of fair value to financial assets when the market for the asset is not 
active. 
October 13, 2008 The American Bankers Association issues a letter to SEC chairman Christopher Cox stating that the FASB Staff Position FAS157-3 
falls short of providing the guidance that is needed and urges the SEC “to use its statutory authority to step in and override the guidance 
issued by FASB” (ABA, 2008b). 
October 29, 2008 SEC hosts first roundtable on mark-to-market accounting related to the study on mark-to-market accounting. Panelists disagree about 
to what extent fair value accounting may have caused or contributed to the financial crisis. However, participants generally agree that 
the exercise of judgment is necessary to appropriately reflect fair value estimates when markets are inactive. 
November 21, 2008 SEC hosts second roundtable on mark-to-market accounting related to the study on mark-to-market accounting. Most panelists agree 
that existing fair value accounting rules did not cause the financial crisis. However, participants also agree that two related aspects of 
fair value accounting need improvement: (1) guidance on the application of existing accounting standards that address whether certain 
assets are impaired, and (2) the determination of fair value estimates in the absence of quoted market prices. 
December 30, 2008 Pursuant to the EESA, the SEC releases its 259-page report on Fair Value accounting (“Report and Recommendations Pursuant to 
Section 133 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Study on Mark- to-Market Accounting”). The SEC calls for more 
guidance on judgment and improvements to valuation and impairment rules. However, the SEC also concludes that mark-to-market 
accounting did not appear to have played a meaningful role in the difficulties suffered by banks and other financial institutions in 2008. 
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Date Event 
February 18, 2009 In response to the recommendations of the SEC, FASB announces the addition of new agenda projects intended to improve (1) the 
application guidance used to determine fair values and (2) disclosure of fair value estimates. However, the FASB also states that these 
projects will not be completed before June 2009 and December 2009, respectively. 
February 2009 A coalition of 31 banks, credit unions, insurance company trade associations, and other financial service industry advocates launch the 
‘Fair Value Coalition’. Members of the coalition are later reported by the Wall Street Journal to have incurred $27.6 million of lobbying 
expenses in the first quarter. Furthermore, coalition members reportedly directed one-quarter million dollars in campaign contributions 
to legislators on the House Financial Services Committee. Of this amount, the largest donor was the American Bankers Association, 
which provided $74,500 to the campaign coffers of 33 committee members in the first quarter (Pulliam and McGinty, 2009). 
March 9, 2009 Shortly before the subcommittee hearing on mark-to-market accounting, the Fair Value Coalition issues a letter to the House Financial 
Services Committee chairman Barney Frank and ranking member Spencer Bachus calling for timely changes in mark-to-market 
accounting. Two days later the same letter is issued to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises, Paul Kanjorski, and ranking member Scott Garret. 
March 12, 2009 The Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Financial Services Committee holds an extraordinary hearing on mark-to-market accounting. During the hearing the subcommittee 
exerts pressure on SEC Acting Chief Accountant James L. Kroeker and FASB Chairman Robert H. Herz to act quickly with respect to 
the SEC's recommendations. In fact, the transcript of the hearings reveals that the committee gave FASB marching orders and threatened 
to take action if FASB did not (see Appendix B.1). 
March 16/17, 2009 Following the Capital Markets Subcommittee hearing, FASB issues proposals for more guidance under FAS 157 and changes to 
impairment rules with comment periods ending April 1, 2009. 
April 2, 2009 FASB approves dissemination of FASB Staff Positions on Fair Value Accounting (FSP FAS 157-4, FSP FAS 115-2 and FAS 124-2) 
in a special meeting. 
April 9, 2009 FASP approves the release of three final FSPs on the FASB's website. 
May 13, 2009 Five members of the Fair Value Coalition issue a letter to the House Financial Services Committee chairman Barney Frank and ranking 
member Spencer Bachus attempting to obtain further relief from FASB standards through additional congressional pressure. The letter 
indicates that the three FASB Staff Positions “only scratched the surface” and “do not focus on the heart of the problem: mark-to-market 
does not provide the most relevant measurement basis for many types of transactions”. 
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APPENDIX C.2 
Timeline of Key Events of the Stock Option Debate in 2003-04 
 
Date Event 
February/March 2002 As part of the response to the major corporate and accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the U.S. Senate holds multiple hearings on "Accounting Reform and Investor Protection".  A bipartisan group of 
senators lead by Carl Levin and John McCain propose S. 1940 "Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act", a bill that 
would require recognition of stock options as an expense in order to address misguided executive incentives. Technology firms 
group together as the International Employee Stock Option Coalition and oppose changes in the accounting for stock options. 
May 1 & May 14, 2002 The Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-sponsored Enterprises of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Financial Services Committee holds a hearing on "Corporate Accounting Practices: Is there a Credibility GAAP?". 
July 12-15, 2002 Senator Carl M. Levin seeks to add an amendment to Senator Sarbanes's bill that would force accounting rule makers to revisit the 
accounting or stock options. Senate refuses to take up the amendment.  
July 2002 Coca-Cola Co. announces that it will start to formally recognize the cost of executive stock options. A number of other companies 
are considering similar steps.  
November 18, 2002 FASB issues an invitation to comment on a comparison of IASB'S and FASB's accounting for stock-based compensation. Until the 
February 2003, the FASB will receive nearly 300 letters in the topic, including letters from members of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. 
House of Representatives. 
January 30, 2003 Several members of the U.S. House of Representatives issue a letter to the FASB to express their strong opposition against any 
proposal which would mandate the expensing of employee stock options. The House letter, sponsored by Rep. David Dreier and 
Rep. Anna G. Eshoo, includes the signatures of 38 other representatives. 
March 12, 2003 The FASB adds a project on employee stock option to its agenda. 
March 20, 2003 Representatives David Dreier and Anna G. Eshoo introduce H.R. 1372 "Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act of 
2003", calling for better disclosure of employee stock options, but prohibiting the SEC from recognizing as GAAP any new standard 
on accounting for employee stock options. 
May 9, 2003 Senators Mike Enzi, George Allen, and Barbara Boxer sponsor a Senate Roundable discussion with FASB's chairman Robert H. 
Herz, questioning the board's authority to decide that companies should treat stock options as expenses. Senator Allen later 
comments that "I'm one who thinks, generally speaking, there should be legislative restraint, [b]ut . . . it makes it very difficult to sit 
back and let unelected people make decisions that have such a harmful impact." (The Washington Post, "Audit Panel's Authority 
Again Challenged on Hill; Standards Board Chief Defends Options Rule", May 9, 2003). 
June 3, 2003 The Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-sponsored Enterprises of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Financial Services Committee holds a hearing on "The Accounting Treatment of Employee Stock Options" to discuss H.R. 1372. 
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Date Event 
October 29, 2003 FASB meets to discuss remaining details before releasing proposed rules on stock-option expensing due early 2004. The media 
reports that the FASB plans to require the mandatory expensing of stock options beginning in 2005.  
November 12, 2003 The Subcommittee on Securities and Investment of the U.S. Senate holds a hearing on "The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
and Small Business Growth" during which senators urge caution on reforming the accounting for stock options arguing that the 
proposed expensing could hurt small businesses. 
November 19, 2003 Senators Mike Enzi, Harry Reid, John Ensign, Barbara Boxer, and George Allen introduce the bipartisan bill S. 1890 "Stock Option 
Accounting Reform Act", a bill similar to H.R. 3574, which is immediately referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs and later sponsored by a total of 30 senators. 
November 21, 2003 Representative Richard Baker, chairman of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-sponsored 
Enterprises, introduces H.R. 3574 "Stock Option Accounting Reform Act" calling for recognizing stock option expense only for a 
firm’s five highest-paid executives and assuming zero stock price volatility. 
January 2004 Senators Richard C. Shelby and Paul S. Sarbanes continue to oppose congressional intervention with the FASB stalling efforts by 
the high-tech industry and their supporters in Congress to block FASB from requiring companies to record stock options as an 
expense. 
March 3, 2004 The Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-sponsored Enterprises of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Financial Services Committee holds a hearing on "H.R. 3574 The Stock Option Accounting Reform Act". 
March 31, 2004 FASB issues the Exposure Draft "Share-Based Payment - An amendment of Statement Nos. 123 and 95" calling for expensing of all 
employee stock options for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2004.  
April 20, 2004 The Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security of the U.S. Senate holds an oversight hearing 
on "Expensing Stock Options: Supporting and Strenghtening the Independence of the Financial Accounting Standards Board". 
April 21 & May 4, 2004 The Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-sponsored Enterprises of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Financial Services Committee holds hearings on "The FASB Stock Options Proposal: Ist Effect on the U.S. Economy and Jobs". 
June 15, 2004 The House Committee on Financial Services voted 45 to 13 to send H.R. 3574 to the full House. 
June 30, 2004 22 members of the U.S. House and Representatives and U.S. Senate write a letter to the FASB in strong support of requiring that all 
employee stock options should be recognized as an expense. In a separate letter to the FASB, Senator Mike B. Enzi requests the 
exemption of small business from the proposed changes to FAS 123 and FAS 95. 
July 20, 2004 Full House approves H.R. 3574 by a vote of 312 to 111, with 11 representatives not voting. Senator Richard C. Shelby, chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and a strong opponent of the bill, blocks a similar senate bill 
introduced by Senator Mike Enzi. 	
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Definition of Independent Variables Used in the Analyses 
Variable Description Source 
Variables used to measure anti-government-intervention ideology 
DW-Nominate 
Ideology Score 
First dimension of the DW-Nominate score provided by Poole and Rosenthal (2011). The score 
measures a legislator’s ideology based on historical voting records and is increasing in 
conservatism. We use the score based on all roll call votes until and including the corresponding 
congressional cycle under investigation.  
Keith Poole's Voteview data website 
(http://voteview.com) 
Special interest connections (fair value accounting setting) 
Financial sector PAC 
contributions ($) 
Dollar amount of campaign contributions received from political action committees (PAC) of 
the financial service industry excl. real state during the 110th congressional cycle between 
January 1, 2007, until September 30, 2008. 
Center for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) 
Financial sector PAC 
contributions (%PAC) 
Campaign contributions received from political action committees (PAC) of the financial 
service industry excluding real state during the 110th congressional cycle between January 1, 
2007, until September 30, 2008, relative to the sum of PAC contributions received from industry 
sectors other than “Finance, Insurance & Real Estate”. 
Center for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) 
Variables related to the potential benefits of April 2009 accounting relaxations to fair value accounting regulations 
Measurement Difference 
Non-guaranteed MBS AfS 
Politician-specific maximum of connected banks' average difference between the amortized cost 
(BHCK1711 + BHCK1735) and the fair value (BHCK1713 + BHCK 1736) of non-guaranteed 
mortgage-backed securities available for sale scaled by total assets (BHCK2170) computed over 
the year 2008 (in percentage points). 
Form FR Y-9C 
Decrease in Ratio of 
L2/L3-FV-Assets Q408-Q109 
Politician-specific maximum of connected banks' decrease in the ratio of level 2 assets (Item 
AOL2Q) to level 3 assets (Item AUL3Q) between Q4 2008 and Q1 2009. 
Compustat Bank 
Fundamentals Quarterly 
CAR (12 March 2009) Three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on March 12, 2009 (the event date). Expected 
returns are calculated based on a market model that estimates beta over the entire year 2008 
using daily returns and the return on the S&P 500 index as a proxy for the daily market return.  
Center for Research in Security Prices 
(Continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX D (continued) 
Variable Description Source 
Special interest connections (stock options setting) 
Comment Letter Opposition 
PAC Contributions ($) 
Dollar amount of campaign contributions received during the 107th congressional cycle 
from political action committees (PAC) of companies and associations that issued a 
comment letter to the FASB opposing the expensing of stock options in response to 
FASB issues No. 1101-001, No. 1102-011, and No. 1102-100.  
Center for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) 
FASB’s Online Comment Letters 
(http://fasb.org) 
Comment Letter Opposition 
PAC Contributions (%PAC) 
Campaign contributions received during the 107th congressional cycle from political 
action committees (PAC) of companies and associations that issued a comment letter to 
the FASB opposing the expensing of stock options in response to FASB issues No. 1101-
001, No. 1102-011, and No. 1102-100; relative to the sum of other PAC contributions 
received during that cycle. 
Center for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) 
FASB’s Online Comment Letters 
(http://fasb.org) 
IESOC PAC Contributions ($) Dollar amount of campaign contributions received during the 107th congressional cycle 
from political action committees (PAC) of companies and associations that were a 
member of the International Employee Stock Option Coalition (IESOC) during 
2003/2004. Members of the IESOC were identified from the internet archive 
(http://www.archive.org) of the IESOC website (http://www.savestockoptions.org) and 
hand-matched with active PACs. The resulting variable includes contributions from 
AOL/Time Warner, American Electronics Association, Cisco Systems, Coors Brewing, 
Dell Computer, EDS, Genentech, General Mills, Information Technology Industry 
Council, Intel Corporation, NASDAQ, National Association of Manufacturers, National 
Venture Capital Association (NVCA), Qualcomm, Semiconductor Equipment and 
Materials International (SEMI), Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), Software & 
Information Industry Association, Sun Microsystems, The Business Software Alliance 
(BSA), The Medical Device Manufacturers Association (MDMA), and Valero Energy. 
Center for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) 
 
IESOC PAC Contributions (%PAC) Campaign contributions received during the 107th congressional cycle from political 
action committees (PAC) of companies and associations that where a member of the 
International Employee Stock Option Coalition during 2003/2004 (see above) relative to 
the sum of other PAC contributions received during that cycle. 
Center for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Variable Description Source 
Potential benefits of connected companies from avoiding the expensing of stock options under the FASB proposal 
Implied total stock option expense 
per FASB proposal 
Politician-specific maximum of connected firms' implied total stock option expense (net 
of tax) per FASB proposal in 2003 scaled by total assets. We are grateful to David B. 
Farber, Marilyn F. Johnson, and Kathy R. Petroni for providing us with the raw data on 
the estimate of the total stock option expense per tje proposed FASB fair-value-based 
method that they hand-collected from each firm’s pro forma footnote disclosure of stock 
option expense in its 2003 Form 10-K (see Farber et al., 2007). The authors did not 
employ Compustat data items #399 (the incremental stock option expense reported in the 
footnotes) and #398 (the stock option expense reported in the income statement), as these 
items often do not match what is reported in the financial statements. 
Farber et al. (2007) 
Representatives' background 
Subcommittee member Indicator variable equal to one if a representative is a member of the Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Financial Services Committee during relevant congressional hearings of 
the subcommittee surrounding the analyzed accounting debates, and zero otherwise. 
Relevant hearings include the hearing on "Mark-to-Market Accounting: Practices and 
Implications" (March 12, 2009) for the fair value debate in 2008-09 and the hearings on 
"Corporate Accounting Practices: Is there a Credibility GAAP" (May 1, 14, 2002), "The 
Accounting Treatment of Employee Stock Options" (June 3, 2003), and "The FASB Stock 
Options Proposal: Its Effect on the U.S. Economy and Jobs" (April 21 & May 4, 2004) 
for the debate on the accounting for stock options in 2003-04.  
Charles Steward III and Jonathan 
Woon's congressional database 
(http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data 
page.html) 
Manual collection from congressional 
hearing documents 
Electoral margin Percentage point difference in the vote percentages between the winner and the runner-
up during the last congressional elections in the corresponding district. 
Federal Election Commission and Keith 
Poole's Voteview data website 
(http://voteview.com) 
Seniority The natural logarithm of the number of terms a representative has spent in Congress 
during the corresponding congressional cycle. 
Charles Steward III and Jonathan 
Woon's congressional database 
(http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data 
page.html) 
Retired Indicator variable equal to one if the representative retired after the 108th (stock option 
debate in 2003-04) or the 110th congressional cycle (fair value debate in 2008-09), and 
zero otherwise. 
Charles Steward III and Jonathan 
Woon's congressional database 
(http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data 
page.html) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Variable Description Source 
Business background Indicator variable equal to one if a representative had a business related occupation prior to joining 
Congress. The variable is constructed based on biographical data from the Center for Responsive 
Politics. 
Manual collection based on data from the Center 
for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) 
Accounting interest Indicator variable equal to one if a representative signed a letter submitted to the FASB or the 
SEC Division of Corporation Finance between 2002 (when unsolicited FASB comment letters 
start to become available online) and July 9, 2008 (start date in the timeline of events in Appendix 
C). 
FASB’s Online Comment Letters 
(http://fasb.org) 
Available comments to SEC Regulatory Actions 
(https://www.sec.gov/rules.shtml) 
EESA voting   
EESA vote ‘Yea’ 
(29 September 2008) 
Indicator variable equal to one if a representative voted ‘Yea’ in the House vote on the EESA on 
September 29, 2008 (H.R. 3997), and zero otherwise. Note that Representative Jerry Weller did 
not cast a vote on that measure and is coded as missing. 
Keith Poole's Voteview data website 
(http://voteview.com) 
EESA vote ‘Yea’ 
(3 October 2008) 
Indicator variable equal to one if a representative voted ‘Yea’ in the House vote on the EESA on 
October 3, 2008 (H.R. 1424), and zero otherwise. 
Keith Poole's Voteview data website 
(http://voteview.com) 
EESA vote-switch 
(‘Nay’ to ‘Yea’) 
Indicator variable equal to one if a representative switched his vote from ‘Nay’ in the House vote 
on the EESA on September 29, 2008 (H.R. 3997) to ‘Yea’ in the House vote on the EESA on 
October 3, 2008 (H.R. 1424), and zero otherwise. 
Keith Poole's Voteview data website 
(http://voteview.com) 
 
Constituent interests   
Workforce in finance Percentage of district non-agricultural employees employed in private-sector financial activities. 
The variable is based on county level data from 2008, which has been transformed to 
congressional district level by weighting employment data with the county's weight in the 
congressional district using MABLE-Geocorr information from the Missouri Census Data Center. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Missouri 
Census Data Center's MABLE-Geocorr2k 
(http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html) 
Workforce in hightech Percentage if district non-agricultural employees employed in the following seven private 
industry sectors: NAICS 325 (chemical manufacturing), 334 (computer and electronics 
manufacturing), 511 (publishing industries), 517 (telecommunications), 518 (data processing, 
hosting, and related services), 519 (other information services), and 541 (professional, scientific, 
and technical services). The variable is based on county level data from 2003, which has been 
transformed to congressional district level by weighting employment data with the county's 
weight in the congressional district using MABLE-Geocorr information from the Missouri Census 
Data Center. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Missouri 
Census Data Center's MABLE-Geocorr2k 
(http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html) 
(Continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX D (continued) 
Variable Description Source 
Change in GDP Percentage change in the annual gross domestic product (GDP). The variable is 
based on regional data on metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), which has been 
transformed to congressional district level by weighting GDP data with the MSA's 
weight in the congressional district using MABLE-Geocorr information from the 
Missouri Census Data Center. Since the definition of MSAs changed over time, we 
use historical data releases from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis to ensure 
correct matching to congressional districts. Specifically, we use the data release from 
26 September 2007 (13 September 2011) to compute the percentage change in GDP 
for 2003 (2008) used in the analysis of the stock option debate in 2003-04 (fair value 
debate in 2008-09).   
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and Missouri 
Census Data Center's MABLE-Geocorr2k 
Constituents’ bailout 
opposition 
Percentage of respondents in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey 
(Ansolabehere, 2011) that opposed the bailout bill (excluding respondents without 
a clear opinion).  
Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/home) 
Loan denial rate Change in the annual home mortgage loan denial rate. The variable is based on the 
total number of mortgage loan applications denied by financial institutions in a 
given year as disclosed under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. We used data on 
county-year level as prepared by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and use 
MABLE-Geocorr information from the Missouri Census Data Center to transform 
the data to congressional district level.  
Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
(http://www.consumerfinance.gov) and Missouri 
Census Data Center's MABLE-Geocorr2k 
Employee stock option interest Campaign contributions received during the 107th congressional cycle from 
individuals that were employed at companies whose employees wrote comment 
letters to the FASB opposing the expensing of stock options in response to FASB 
issues No. 1101-001, No. 1102-011, and No. 1102-100; relative to the sum 
individual contributions received during that cycle. Employers with employees 
writing comment letters and contributing to election campaigns include Altera, 
Applied Materials, Biosite Diagnostics, Cisco Systems, EFI, EXAR, ILOG, Intel, 
JDS Uniphase, KLA-Tencor, Lantronix, Power Integrations, RF Micro Devices, 
Sierra, Silicon Laboratories, Silicon Optix, Sun Microsystems, and Synopsys. 
Center for Responsive Politics 
(http://www.opensecrets.org) 
FASB’s Online Comment Letters 
(http://fasb.org) 
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APPENDIX E 
Examples for Coding of Representatives' Types of Statements on Fair Value Accounting 
Statement Type Description Example(s) 
Calls for ‘market-
based solutions’ 
Indicator variable equal to one if the politician issues at 
least one fair value statement that argues against 
government interventions and/or directly calls for more 
market-based solutions, and zero otherwise. 
“Action is clearly needed to return stability to our financial markets, but most 
importantly, effective, sound action is needed. To fix the markets, we must deliver a 
market-based solution, not a government bailout.  
[...] 
Suspending the highly controversial “mark to market” accounting standard.“ 
Calls for ‘bailout 
alternative’ 
Indicator variable equal to one if the politician issues at 
least one fair value statement that calls for the suspension 
or change of fair value accounting rules as an alternative 
(potentially among others) to a government bailout, and 
zero otherwise. 
"The Administration and Secretary Paulson tried to ram an ill-conceived bailout of 
Wall Street through Congress that left Main Street to pick up the tab. Congress 
rejected it. Instead, Congress must consider, in a deliberative and collaborative way, 
a comprehensive solution that will address the causes of this problem, not just the 
symptoms. [...] The Securities and Exchange Commission should be required to 
immediately suspend Mark-to-Market accounting standards. These unrealistic rules 
add unnecessary volatility to the current situation and signiﬁcantly constrain the 
ability of banks to lend to families and businesses." 
Focus on specific 
weakness of fair 
value accounting 
Indicator variable equal to one, if the politician issues at 
least one individual fair value statement in the form of a 
press release, interview, speech, commentary, blog post, 
or proposed bill (i.e., no group statement) that puts some 
emphasis on the topic of fair value accounting (i.e., does 
not mention the topic as a side remark or in form of a list 
of alternative proposals), and zero otherwise. 
“The remaining areas that need to be given prompt attention are the mark-to-market 
accounting rules and short-seller regulations. The pro-cyclical effects of mark-to-
market accounting are widely acknowledged as a major contributor to the current 
crisis. While it is also recognized that mark-to-market was a well-intentioned 
attempt to address the abuses of Enron, WorldCom and others, the negative 
consequences in a market that is not functioning normally negate the benefits. The 
suspension of mark-to-market accounting would be unwarranted in a normally 
functioning market environment. In a full blown crisis, some alternative ought to be 
available to allow our financial institutions to value assets based on a reasonable 
expectation of anticipated payoff. Therefore, I will continue to urge the SEC to find 
an appropriate balance.” 
(Continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX E (continued) 
Statement Type Description Example(s) 
Calls for other 
alternative 
proposals 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if the politician issues at 
least one statement with several alternative proposals and 
if the number of alternative proposals mentioned is 
above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
Example 1 (list within a text): 
"[…] It reduces corporate and capital gains taxes to unleash private capital into 
American businesses, create more jobs, and give people more freedom to make 
invcstment decisions with dollars currently hoarded by the fedcral governmcnt. It 
would suspend mark-to-market accounting, allowing companies to morc accurately 
report the true value of their assets on their balance sheets. It breaks up Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac -- who are, after all, at the heart of all of this -- so that the 
encumbered taxpayer no longer backs them -- implicitly or explicitly -- and so that 
thcy do not artificially grow larger than the market will allow. And, it ensures the 
Federal Rescrve's attention is focused on that oflong-tcrm price stability rather than 
short term economic growth.” 
 
Example 2 (list of bullet points; often included in press releases): 
- “Providing secured loans or establishing a loan guarantee program, 
instead of a model of direct purchases of highly illiquid assets and 
securities. 
- Providing a significant and immediate tax credit for purchasing a home. 
- Requiring the Treasury Secretary to provide a report on the future role of 
the federal government in the U.S. mortgage market.  
- Specifying how the government would price problem assets.  
- Suspending the highly controversial “mark to market” accounting 
standard.  
- Increasing transparency in the clearing and settlement of “swaps” 
contracts.” 
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APPENDIX F 
Examples for Coding of Argument Categories Referenced by Representatives during Hearings on Accounting for Stock Options 
Argument Category Included Terms  Example(s) 
Ideology-related arguments  
Excessive Executive 
Compensation 
excessive compensation*, 
excessive executive 
compensation*, excessive 
executive pay*, excessive pay*, 
excessive*, fat-cat*, fatten*, 
golden parachute*, multimillion*, 
perk*, retirement benefits*, stealth 
compensation* 
Example 1: 
“I think, first of all, that the term stock options is something that people instantly think of when the 
term is stated that it has—it is a term that has become sullied; and that, of course, is the result of the 
misuse and the abuse of stock options that produced the scandals and the excessive executive 
compensation.” 
Example 2: 
“Stock options, since the 1980’s, have provided the majority of CEO pay. Every year since then the 
CEO compensation has gone up, good times and bad, while leaving average worker pay further and 
further behind. […]Average CEO pay in this country is now 300 times the average worker pay. Stock 
options are the largest single factor in that pay gap. They operate as stealth compensation because 
most U.S. companies do not show stock option compensation as an expense on their books.” 
Wealth Participation  average employee*, average 
person*, average worker*, low-
paying*, middle class*, middle-
class*, rank and file*, rank-and-
file*, working class*, labor 
movement*, labor union*, little 
guys*, non-management* 
Example 1: 
“So this debate today, and make no mistake about it, listen carefully, this is about protecting a tool 
that has paid off for rank-and-file workers across the country. This is not only about high technology 
and biotechnology. In fact, most of the stock option holders’ rank-and-file are outside of those two 
industries, and they represent 14.6 million workers in our country. 
[…] 
It’s ironic that many are calling for the expensing of stock options in order to reign in executive 
compensation, when expensing stock options would do little to accomplish this. Rather rank and file 
employees would be the ones to lose, because they don’t get to negotiate with a Board of Directors for 
their compensation package.” 
Example 2: 
“So what we do know is that there are a lot of working-class folks and middle-class folks who have 
stock options, but there may not be a lot of options in the hands of working-class folks.” 
(Continued on next page)  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972549 
 
 66 
APPENDIX F (continued) 
Argument Category Included Terms  Example(s) 
Scandal abuse*, corruption*, dishonest*, 
enron*, fraud*, misconduct*, 
restor*, scandal*, tyco*, 
worldcom* 
“As we have seen, the prominence of options and executive compensation packages has actually served 
as an incentive for executives of certain now-defunct companies like Enron to engage in complex 
structured finance deals that had the practical effect of manipulating the company’s stock price. Enron 
executives had every reason to work to maintain an artificially high stock price. The higher the stock 
price of the company, the more valuable these executives’s options became.” 
Special interest-related arguments  
Hightech Industry bio-tech*, high-tech*, tech* Example 1: 
“I urge my colleagues to oppose it because it will hurt start-ups and it will hurt high-tech companies.” 
Example 2: 
“Mandatory expensing of stock options would have a terrible impact on companies that rely on options 
to recruit and retain the most talented employees. Without stock options, many of these companies—
including some of the most successful high-tech and biotech firms—would not even exist today.” 
 Recruiting talent applicant*, attract*, brain*, 
bright*, candidat*, engineer*, 
high-skilled*, skill*, qualif*, 
recruit*, retain*, scientist*, 
talent*, job-creation*, job 
creation* 
Example 1: 
“Our most successful enterprises, many of which are small businesses and venture capital companies, 
would not be as successful as they are today but for their ability to attract and retain talented employees 
by giving them ownership in that endeavor.” 
Example 2 
“These are companies which may be on the cusp of actually developing a cure for diabetes, a company 
with a couple dozen employees which may develop a cure for stroke, a company with a couple dozen 
employees that have a solution so you cannot see muzzle fire from our soldiers’ rifles. These type of 
companies use this system to bring in talent, and bringing in talent is absolutely fundamental to the 
innovation economy of America.” 
Example 3: 
“The FASB rule hurts the ability of high-tech firms to recruit and retain good personnel as stock options 
were and still are used by start-up and venture capital firms to attract the talent that is needed when 
capital is sparse.” 
(Continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX F (continued) 
Argument Category Included Terms  Example(s) 
Technical arguments   
Earnings per share adjusted earning*, dilut*, 
earnings per share*, earnings-
per-share*, eps*, overstated 
earnings* 
Example 1: 
“If you are a shareholder and you are worried about diluted effect, in other words, they are giving an 
option to someone, what does that do to my asset in the company, you can find that out with an 
examination of the annual report.”  
Example 2: 
“Those investors who wanted to invest in companies based on their earnings per share unadjusted for 
stock option expense could do it on that basis. And those who believe that they would make better 
decisions with the other number could use that number.” 
Method/concept binomial*, black-scholes*, 
calculation*, determin*, 
estimation method*, fair value*, 
formula*, method*, model*, 
notional value* 
Example 1: 
“And I might just add, while we are talking about this, that in the area of accounting, we can talk about 
Black-Scholes being imprecise and laugh about it, whatever it might be, and certainly it is imprecise, 
but so is sometimes the good will, depreciation and a whole series of other accounting measures that 
are used in determining the values of corporations. It is not all quite as black and white as everybody 
would like.” 
Example 2: 
“One of the things that I struggle with, which I would appreciate your input on, is whatever system you 
use for valuating these stock options, whether they be narrowly or broadly distributed, there are 
assumptions underlying the valuations. Is it your concern that the assumptions, say, under a Black-
Scholes method or some iteration of that, is it your concern that the assumptions will be as inaccurate, 
perhaps, as the current levels of disclosure might be?” 
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FIGURE 1 
Frequency of Representatives’ Statements on Fair Value Accounting (2008-2009) 
 
 
Notes: Figure 1 displays the number of individual politicians with statements on fair value accounting on a weekly basis over time. The sample of politicians includes all 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives that served during the 110th congressional cycle. 
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FIGURE 2 
Geographic Distribution of Negative Statements on Fair Value Accounting by Members of the 110th U.S. House of Representatives 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 2 illustrates the geographic distribution of members of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 110th congressional cycle with and without negative 
statements and proposals on fair value accounting between September 2008 and April 2009. 
 Dark red colored areas: Republican representatives that issued a negative statement in fair value accounting in fall 2008 and/or March/April 2009. 
 Light red colored areas: Republican representatives without statements. 
 Dark blue colored areas: Democratic representatives that issued a negative statement in fair value accounting in fall 2008 and/or March/April 2009. 
 Light blue colored areas: Democratic representatives without statements.
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FIGURE 3 
Geographic Distribution of Members of the 108th U.S. House of Representatives (co-)sponsoring H.R. 1372 and/or H.R. 3574 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure3 illustrates the geographic distribution of members of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 108th congressional cycle that (co-sponsored) either 
H.R. 1372 "Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act" or H.R. 3574 "Stock Option Accounting Reform Act", or both. 
 Dark red colored areas: Republican representatives (co-)sponsoring H.R. 1372 and/or H.R. 3574. 
 Light red colored areas: Republican representatives not (co-)sponsoring either H.R. 1372 or H.R. 3574. 
 Dark blue colored areas: Democratic representatives (co-)sponsoring H.R. 1372 and/or H.R. 3574. 
 Light blue colored areas: Democratic representatives not (co-)sponsoring either H.R. 1372 or H.R. 3574.
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FIGURE 4 
Ideology, Special Interests and the Timing of the Republicans’ Initial Fair Value Statements in September/October 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 4 presents boxplot diagrams illustrating the relationship between the timing of Republican representatives’ 
initial statements and their ideology as well as special interests around the bailout vote in September and October 2008. 
Boxplots show the mean as well as the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentile values of the DW-Nominate ideology score and the 
Percentage of financial sector PAC contributions (%PAC). Both diagrams correspond show four boxplots each corresponding 
to initial statements issued (1) before September 29, 2008, (2) on September 29, 2008 (the day of the first bailout voting), (3) 
the days immediately after the first bailout vote until mark-to-market suspension was included in the EESA, i.e., October 1, 
2008 (see Appendix B.2 and Appendix C), and (4) after October 1, 2008. Statistics presented between each boxplots 
correspond to the result of t-Tests for differences in means across time periods.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972549 
 
 72 
TABLE 1 
Statements on Fair Value Accounting (FVA) by Members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Panel A: Source and Frequency of Statements on FVA issued by Representatives (110th Congress) 
 Fall 2008  March/April 2009  Combined 
 N %  N %  N % 
Speech/Hearing 48 14.4  70 41.4  118 23.5 
Press release/Commentary 78 23.4  33 19.5  111 22.1 
Bill/Petition/Proposal/Request 93 27.8  6 3.6  99 19.7 
Official letter 66 19.8  18 10.7  84 16.7 
Press article 42 12.6  37 21.9  79 15.7 
Interview 4 1.2  4 2.4  8 1.6 
Other 3 0.9  1 0.6  4 0.8 
Total 334 100  169 100  503  
    of: Statements with stated opinion 308   147   455  
         
Panel B: Opinion and Frequency of Statements on FVA aggregated by Individual Representative (110th 
Congress) 
 Fall 2008  March/April 2009  Combined 
 N %  N %  N % 
#Representatives (110th Congress) 434   380   434  
     of: Statements on FVA 121 27.9  48 12.6  139 32.0 
         
     Negative statements only 117 96.7  47 96.0  134 96.4 
     Positive statements only 3 2.5  1 2.0  4 2.9 
     Neutral statements only 0 0  0 0  0 0 
     Mixed statements 1 0.8  1 2.0  1 0.7 
 121   49   139  
Panel C: Negative Statements on FVA and Representatives' Party Membership 
 Fall 2008  March/April 2009  Combined 
 N %  N %  N % 
Democratic Representatives (N = 236) 14 11.9  16 33.3  26 19.3 
Republican Representatives (N = 198) 104 88.1  32 66.6  109 80.7 
 118   48   135  
Panel D: Representatives’ Statements on FVA and their Voting on the EESA 
    
Negative statement on FVA (Fall 2008) 
EESA vote 
(September 29, 2008) 
 EESA vote  
(October 3, 2008) 
       ‘Yea’ ‘Nay’ Total  ‘Yea’ ‘Nay’ Total 
        Yes 22 95 117  45 72 117 
No 183 133 316  218 99 317 
Total 205 228 433  263 171 434 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Notes: Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for statements on fair value accounting issued by politicians who were member 
of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 110th congressional cycle. Panel A reports the source and frequency of 
identified statements. The column Fall 2008 (March/April 2009) holds all statements that have been issued in the last (first) 
four months of the year 2008 (2009). The column Combined reports the frequency of all relevant statements over the full 
time period. Panel B reports the frequency of stated opinions aggregated for individual representatives in the 110th 
congressional cycle. Note that the 110th congressional cycle comprises only N = 434 distinct representatives because one 
representative died in August 2008 (Stephanie Tubbs Jones). Her replacement (Marcia Fudge) did not join Congress before 
November 19, 2008. Negative (Positive, Neutral) statements only reports the frequency of representatives that issued only 
negative (positive, neutral) statements in the corresponding time period. Mixed statements reports the frequency of 
politicians that issued multiple statements with different opinion. Panel C reports the frequency of negative (or mixed) 
statements on fair value accounting by representatives' party membership. Panel D presents descriptive statistics for 
representatives’ positioning on fair value accounting during fall 2008 and their voting records on the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act. Voting records are collected from http://voteview.com. Note that the vote on September 29, 2008, 
comprises only N = 433 distinct representatives, because Rep. Jerry Weller did not cast a vote on that measure. 
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TABLE 2 
Support of Proposed Legislations on Stock Option Accounting by Members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
 
Panel A: (Co-)Sponsorship of H.R. 1372 “Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act” 
 Democratic Representatives  Republican Representatives  Total 
 N %  N %  N % 
Yes 43 21,1  68 30,1  111 25,8 
No 161 78,9  158 69,9  319 74,2 
 204 100,0  226 100,0  430 100,0 
Panel B: (Co-)Sponsorship of H.R. 3574 “Stock Option Accounting Reform Act” 
 Democratic Representatives  Republican Representatives  Total 
 N %  N %  N % 
Yes 58 28,4  73 32,3  131 30,5 
No 146 71,6  153 67,7  299 69,5 
 204 100,0  226 100,0  430 100,0 
Panel C: July 2004 House Vote on H.R. 3574 “Stock Option Accounting Reform Act” 
 Democratic Representatives  Republican Representatives  Total 
 N %  N %  N % 
'Yea' 112 54,9  196 86,7  308 71,6 
'Nay' 89 43,6  22 9,7  111 25,8 
Did not vote 3 1,5  8 3,5  11 2,6 
 204 100,0  226 100,0  430 100,0 
Notes: Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the (co-)sponsorship of H.R. 1372 “Broad-Based Stock Option Plan 
Transparency Act” (Panel A) and H.R. 3574 “Stock Option Accounting Reform Act” (Panel B) of members of the U.S. House 
of Representatives during the 108th congressional cycle as well as their voting on H.R. 3574 in July 2014 (Panel C). The 
sample excludes all members that either joined or left the U.S. House during the congressional cycle (e.g., replacements of 
members who resigned, died, etc.) resulting in a sample of 430 Representatives who were a member of the House during 
the entire 108th congressional cycle. Note that out of these 430 members, 11 members did not cast a vote on H.R. 3574. 
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics for Representatives’ Ideology and Special Interests 
 
Panel A: Ideology, Special Interests, and Negative Statements on Fair Value Accounting in 2008-09 
 Negative statement = Yes  Negative statement = No  t-Test 
[p-value]  N Mean Std. Dev. Median  N Mean Std. Dev. Median  
Ideology            
    DW-Nominate Ideology Score 134 0.492 0.434 0.648  300 -0.060 0.457 -0.273  [<0.001]*** 
Special interest connections            
Financial sector PAC contributions ($) 134 86,969 110,276 39,250  300 55,782 76,470 26,750  [0.001]*** 
Financial sector PAC contributions (%PAC) 134 23.630 34.569 10.691  300 11.695 16.392 6.384  [<0.001]*** 
Panel B: Ideology, Special Interests, and Representatives’ Support for Stock Option Legislation in 2003 
 (Co-)Sponsorship of H.R. 1372 or H.R. 3574 = YES  
(Co-)Sponsorship of H.R. 1372 
or H.R. 3574 = NO  t-Test 
[p-value] 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Median  N Mean Std. Dev. Median  
Ideology            
     DW-Nominate Ideology Score 152 0.252 0.489 0.498  278 0.078 0.488 -0.089  [<0.001]*** 
Special interest connections            
    Comment Letter Opposition PAC Contributions ($) 152 17,687 16,007 13,000  278 12,358 15,964 7,350  [0.001]*** 
    Comment Letter Opposition PAC Contributions (%PAC) 152 4.181 3.236 3.581  278 2.693 2.362 2.432  [<0.001]*** 
Notes: Table 3 presents summary statistics of the main regression variables for ideology and special interests. Panel A reports statistics for members of the 110th U.S. 
House of Representatives that did issue and did not issue a negative statement on fair value accounting between September 2008 and April 2009. Panel B reports 
statistics for members of the 108th U.S. House of Representatives based on their decision to (co-)sponsor H.R. 1372 and/or H.R. 3574. Please refer to Appendix D for 
a full description of all variables. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Cross-Sectional Determinants of Representatives’ Public Involvement in Accounting Regulation 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Analysis of Representatives’ Public Involvement during the Fair Value Debate in 2008-09 
 DW-Nominate Ideology Score 432 0.108 0.517 -0.681 -0.145 1.223 
 Special Interests (%PAC) 432 15.394 24.197 -8.121 7.988 230.728 
 Subcommittee member 432 0.095 0.293 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Electoral margin 432 0.353 0.261 0.000 0.308 1.000 
 Seniority 432 1.704 0.689 0.693 1.792 3.332 
 Retired 432 0.058 0.234 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Business background 432 0.164 0.371 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Accounting interest 432 0.125 0.331 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 EESA vote-switch (‘Nay’ to ‘Yea’) 432 0.134 0.341 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Workforce in finance 432 0.049 0.019 0.020 0.044 0.153 
 Change in GDP 432 0.121 0.183 -0.280 0.063 0.705 
 Constituents’ bailout opposition 432 0.725 0.098 0.279 0.741 0.966 
 Loan denial rate 432 0.002 0.014 -0.039 0.001 0.046 
Analysis of Representatives’ Public Involvement during the Stock Option Debate in 2003-04 
 DW-Nominate Ideology Score 428 0.138 0.495 -0.669 0.342 1.085 
 Special Interests (%PAC) 428 3.230 2.793 0.000 2.739 17.458 
 Subcommittee member 428 0.140 0.348 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Electoral margin 428 0.424 0.259 0.001 0.378 1.000 
 Seniority 428 1.733 0.592 0.693 1.792 3.258 
 Retired 428 0.035 0.184 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Business background 428 0.145 0.352 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Accounting interest 428 0.140 0.348 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Workforce in hightech 428 0.095 0.047 0.025 0.091 0.332 
 Change in GDP 428 0.153 0.219 -0.421 0.065 2.122 
 Employee stock option interest 428 0.072 0.375 0.000 0.000 4.808 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Logit Regressions 
  
Public Involvement 
(Opposition to 
Fair Value Accounting) 
Public Involvement 
(Opposition to 
Stock Option Expensing) 
DW-Nominate Ideology Score 0.418*** 0.223*** 
 (0.027) (0.039) 
   Special Interests 0.002*** 0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) 
   
Control variables for Representatives' Background   
     Subcommittee member 0.245*** 0.087 
  (0.063) (0.069) 
     Electoral margin 0.225*** 0.014 
  (0.085) (0.070) 
     ln(Seniority) -0.068** -0.163*** 
  (0.029) (0.033) 
     Retired -0.282** -0.073 
  (0.119) (0.110) 
     Business background 0.050 -0.003 
  (0.040) (0.063) 
     Accounting interest -0.020 -0.081* 
  (0.046) (0.047) 
     EESA vote switch from 0.158***  
 (‘Nay’ to ‘Yea’) (0.051)  
    
Control Variables for Constituent Interests 
     Workforce in finance/hightech 0.311 0.409 
  (0.945) (0.437) 
     Change in GDP 0.086 -0.145** 
  (0.100) (0.071) 
     Bailout opposition 0.098  
  (0.214)  
     Loan denial rate -1.621  
  (1.213)  
     Employee stock option interest  0.200 
   (0.215) 
    Constant Yes Yes 
N 432 428 
McFadden's Adj. R-squared 0.306 0.216 
Count R-squared 0.836 0.818 
Notes: Table 4 presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the results from logit regressions (Panel B) for the analysis of 
Representatives’ propensity to become publicly involved in accounting regulation. The table reports average marginal 
effects and White’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Please refer to Appendix D for a full 
description of all variables. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Political Connections, Ideology, and the Timing of Representatives’ Involvement in the Fair Value Debate: 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample 
 Fall 2008  March/April 2009  Total 
  N   N  N 
#Representatives (110th Congress)  434   380  814 
     Less: Missing data for control variables on 
congressional district level -2 432  -2 378  810 
     Less: Representatives connected to commercial 
banks without accounting data of BHC 
matches -64 368  -56 322  690 
Less: Missing accounting data of BHC matches  
 for Decrease in Ratio of L2/L3 FV-Assets  
 Q408-Q209 -14 354  -13 309  663 
        
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Ideology variables       
 DW-Nominate Ideology Score 810 0.089 0.523 -0.704 -0.178 1.292 
Special interest variables       
 Financial sector PAC contributions (%PAC) 810 15.563 24.709 -8.121 7.988 230.728 
 Measurement Difference Non-guaranteed MBS AfS 690 0.424 0.420 0.000 0.393 1.522 
 Decrease in Ratio of L2/L3 FV-Assets Q408-Q109 663 0.133 0.226 -0.145 0.091 1.413 
 CAR (12 March 2009) 690 0.148 0.081 -0.042 0.135 0.510 
Control variables for representatives' background       
 Subcommittee member 810 0.101 0.302 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Electoral margin 810 0.377 0.267 0.000 0.319 1.000 
 Seniority 810 1.886 0.578 0.693 1.946 3.367 
 Retired 810 0.031 0.173 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Business background 810 0.164 0.371 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Accounting interest  810 0.123 0.329 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 EESA vote-switch (‘Nay’ to ‘Yea’) 810 0.140 0.347 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Control variables for constituent interests       
 Workforce in finance 810 0.050 0.020 0.020 0.044 0.153 
 Change in GDP 810 -0.000 0.246 -0.954 0.014 0.705 
 Constituents’ bailout opposition 810 0.723 0.099 0.279 0.740 0.966 
 Loan denial rate 810 -0.032 0.039 -0.118 -0.017 0.046 
Notes: Table 5 Panel A (Panel B) presents details of the sample selection (descriptive statistics) for OLS panel regressions 
for the analysis of the timing of the political statements on fair value accounting in 2008-09. The sample includes all 
observations for representatives that served 110th congressional cycle. In addition, for specific proxies used to measure 
special interests, we require politicians to have financial ties with the financial service industry. Please refer to Appendix 
D for a full description of all variables. 
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TABLE 6 
Political Connections, Ideology, and the Timing of Representatives’ Involvement in the Stock Option Debate: 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample 
 H.R. 1372  H.R. 3574  Total 
  N   N  N 
#Representatives (110th Congress)  435   435  870 
     Less: Congressional districts whose representatives left 
or joined the 108th Congress during the 
congressional cycle  -5   -5  860 
     Less: Missing data for control variables on congressional 
district level  -2   -2  856 
        
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Median Max 
Ideology variables       
 DW-Nominate Ideology Score 856 0.138 0.495 -0.669 0.342 1.085 
Special interest variables       
 Comment Letter Opposition PAC Contributions (%PAC) 856 3.230 2.792 0.000 2.739 17.458 
 IESOC PAC Contributions (%PAC) 856 0.901 1.277 0.000 0.535 10.665 
 Implied Total Stock Option Expense per FASB Proposal 856 3.490 4.108 0.000 3.094 15.754 
Control variables for representatives’ background       
 Subcommittee member 856 0.107 0.310 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Electoral margin 856 0.424 0.259 0.001 0.378 1.000 
 Seniority 856 1.733 0.592 0.693 1.792 3.258 
 Retired 856 0.035 0.184 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Business background 856 0.145 0.352 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Accounting interest  856 0.140 0.347 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Control variables for constituent interests 
 Workforce in hightech 856 0.095 0.047 0.025 0.091 0.332 
 Change in GDP 856 0.153 0.219 -0.421 0.065 2.122 
 Employee stock option interest 856 0.072 0.374 0.000 0.000 4.808 
Notes: Table 6 Panel A (Panel B) presents details of the sample selection (descriptive statistics) for OLS panel regressions 
for the analysis of the (co-)sponsoring of bills related to the regulation of accounting for stock options during 2003. The 
sample includes all observations for representatives that served 108th congressional cycle. Please refer to Appendix D for 
a full description of all variables. 
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TABLE 7 
Political Connections, Ideology, and the Timing of Representatives’ Involvement: Univariate Tests 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-Difference Tests for Representatives' Statements during the Fair Value Debate in 2008-09 
Ideology (= DW-Nominate Ideology Score)     
 Full Sample  Switchers 
  Fall 2008 March/April 2009    Fall 2008 March/April 2009  
Negative Statement N 432 378 Diff. (p-value)   106 93 Diff. (p-value) 
Yes 162 0.564 0.418 -0.146 (0.049)   0.535 0.002 -0.533 (<0.001) 
No 648 -0.061 0.020 0.081 (0.034) 
Diff. (p-value)  0.625 (<0.001) 0.398 (<0.001) -0.227 (0.014) 
Special Interests (= Financial sector PAC contributions (%PAC)) 
 Full Sample  Switchers 
  Fall 2008 March/April 2009    Fall 2008 March/April 2009  
Negative Statement N 434 380 Diff. (p-value)   106 93 Diff. (p-value) 
Yes 162 20.876 38.666 17.790 (0.007)   16.028 42.588 26.560 (<0.001) 
No 648 13.358 12.660 -0.698 (n.s.) 
Diff. (p-value)  7.518 (0.004) 26.006 (<0.001) 18.488 (0.013) 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Difference-in-Difference Tests for Representatives’ Support of Congressional Bills during the Stock Option Debate in 2003-04 
Ideology (= DW-Nominate Ideology Score)     
 Full Sample  Switchers 
  H.R. 1372 H.R. 3574    H.R. 1372 H.R. 3574  
(Co-)Sponsorship N 428 428 Diff. (p-value)   62 62 Diff. (p-value) 
Yes 242 0.276 0.226 -0.050 (n.s.)   0.413 0.187 -0.226 (0.081) 
No 614 0.090 0.099 0.009 (n.s.) 
Diff. (p-value)  0.186 (<0.001) 0.127 (0.015) -0.059 (n.s.) 
Special Interests (=Comment Letter Opposition PAC Contributions (%PAC)) 
 Full Sample  Switchers 
  H.R. 1372 H.R. 3574    H.R. 1372 H.R. 3574  
(Co-)Sponsorship N 428 428 Diff. (p-value)   62 62 Diff. (p-value) 
Yes 242 4.507 4.324 -0.183 (n.s.)   3.285 3.298 0.013 (n.s.) 
No 614 2.783 2.747 -0.036 (n.s.) 
Diff. (p-value)  1.72 (<0.001) 1.577 (<0.001) -0.147 (n.s.) 
Notes: Table 7 presents univariate statistics on the relationship between representatives' participation in the fair value debate (Panel A) and the stock option debate (Panel 
B) and their level of ideology and special interests. Panel A compares the fair value debate in fall 2008 and in March/April 2009, while Panel B compares the 
(co-)sponsorship of H.R. 1372 and H.R. 3574. The table shows the mean values of the DW-Nominate ideology score and the percentage of financial sector PAC 
contributions (Panel A) or the percentage of PAC contributions from institutions that submitted an opposing comment letter to the FASB (Panel B) as well as the number 
of observations. Please refer to Appendix D for a full description of all variables.  The reported p-values are based on two-sided t-tests. 
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TABLE 8 
Ideology, Political Connections and the Timing of Representatives’ Statements: OLS Regressions 
 
Panel A: OLS Panel Regressions for Representatives' Involvement in the Fair Value Debate (2008-09) 
 All Representatives  Switchers only 
[Special Interests =]  
Financial 
sector PAC 
contributions 
(%PAC) 
Measurement 
Difference 
Non-guaranteed 
MBS AfS 
Decrease in 
Ratio of 
L2/L3 FV-
Assets 
Q408-Q109 
CAR 
(12 March 
2009) 
 
Financial sector 
PAC 
contributions 
(%PAC) 
Measurement 
Difference 
Non-guaranteed 
MBS AfS 
Decrease in 
Ratio of 
L2/L3 FV-
Assets 
Q408-Q109 
CAR 
(12 March 
2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          Test Variables          
Ideology 0.508*** 0.548*** 0.531*** 0.550***  0.329*** 0.370*** 0.375*** 0.376*** 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046)  (0.095) (0.106) (0.112) (0.108) 
          Ideology  -0.362*** -0.410*** -0.399*** -0.406***  -0.657*** -0.778*** -0.783*** -0.780*** 
* March/April 2009 (0.048) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)  (0.188) (0.207) (0.215) (0.208) 
          Special interests 0.000 -0.049 -0.067 -0.260  -0.004* -0.253** -0.353* -1.015** 
 (0.001) (0.048) (0.099) (0.258)  (0.002) (0.100) (0.186) (0.398) 
          Special interests  0.003** 0.198*** 0.353** 0.825**  0.007* 0.553** 0.729* 1.980** 
* March/April 2009 (0.001) (0.065) (0.143) (0.321)  (0.004) (0.214) (0.410) (0.842) 
          March/April 2009 -0.262*** -0.317*** -0.275*** -0.344***  -0.461** -0.566*** -0.400** -0.566** 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.078)  (0.213) (0.205) (0.196) (0.229) 
          
Control Variables for Representatives' Background 
Subcommittee member 0.194*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.232***  -0.008 -0.045 -0.032 -0.030 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052)  (0.012) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) 
          Electoral margin 0.133** 0.133** 0.127** 0.135**  0.013 0.015 0.019 0.019 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)  (0.020) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) 
          Seniority -0.044* -0.028 -0.024 -0.024  -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
          Retired -0.336*** -0.388*** -0.371*** -0.393***  0.046 0.008 0.081** -0.026 
 (0.070) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)  (0.050) (0.045) (0.034) (0.062) 
          Business background 0.026 0.015 0.016 0.014  0.006 0.008 0.007 0.014 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
          Accounting interest 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.011  -0.008 -0.030 -0.029 -0.020 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041)  (0.013) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) 
                    (Continued on next page)  
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
 All Representatives  Switchers only 
[Special Interests =]  
Financial 
sector PAC 
contributions 
(%PAC) 
Measurement 
Difference 
Non-guaranteed 
MBS AfS 
Decrease in 
Ratio of 
L2/L3 FV-
Assets 
Q408-Q109 
CAR 
(12 March 
2009) 
 
Financial sector 
PAC 
contributions 
(%PAC) 
Measurement 
Difference 
Non-guaranteed 
MBS AfS 
Decrease in 
Ratio of 
L2/L3 FV-
Assets 
Q408-Q109 
CAR 
(12 March 
2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              EESA vote switch 0.068** 0.071* 0.079** 0.072**  -0.005 -0.012 -0.008 -0.010 
    (‘Nay’ to ‘Yea’) (0.033) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036)  (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
          
Control Variables for Constituent Interests 
Workforce in finance 0.026 0.377 0.408 0.456  0.168 0.453 0.449 0.331 
 (0.545) (0.554) (0.562) (0.577)  (0.319) (0.379) (0.392) (0.380) 
          Change in GDP -0.016 -0.047 -0.055 -0.047  -0.182 -0.407* -0.411* -0.401* 
 (0.048) (0.057) (0.059) (0.057)  (0.164) (0.212) (0.219) (0.214) 
          Constituents’ bailout  0.009 0.033 0.031 0.036  0.062 0.070 0.094 0.102 
opposition (0.134) (0.152) (0.155) (0.153)  (0.049) (0.071) (0.075) (0.080) 
          Loan denial rate -1.160 -1.159 -1.168 -0.991  1.449 1.452 1.581 2.188 
 (0.855) (0.900) (0.920) (0.926)  (1.826) (1.793) (1.937) (2.112) 
                    Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          N 810 690 663 690  199 175 166 175 
Adj. R-squared 0.320 0.342 0.328 0.337  0.564 0.646 0.606 0.618 
          (Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
Panel B: OLS Panel Regressions for Representatives’ Involvement in the Stock Option Debate (2003-04) 
 All Representatives  Switchers only 
[Special Interests =]  
Comment Letter 
Opposition PAC 
Contributions 
(%PAC) 
IESOC PAC 
Contributions 
(%PAC) 
Implied Total 
Stock Option 
Expense per FASB 
Proposal 
 Comment Letter 
Opposition PAC 
Contributions 
(%PAC) 
IESOC PAC 
Contributions 
(%PAC) 
Implied Total 
Stock Option 
Expense per 
FASB Proposal 
 (1) (2) (3)  (6) (7) (8) 
        Test Variables        
Ideology 0.069 0.107** 0.112**  0.247* 0.221* 0.213* 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.045)  (0.134) (0.124) (0.126) 
        Ideology  -0.043 -0.041 -0.030  -0.496* -0.444* -0.433* 
* H.R. 3574 Support (0.040) (0.038) (0.041)  (0.264) (0.246) (0.248) 
        Special interests 0.033*** 0.075*** 0.014**  -0.016 -0.082 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.006)  (0.029) (0.065) (0.020) 
        Special interests  0.004 0.016 -0.002  0.031 0.154 -0.010 
* H.R. 3574 Support (0.007) (0.011) (0.004)  (0.057) (0.127) (0.041) 
        H.R. 3574 Support 0.036 0.035* 0.054**  0.349* 0.294 0.465*** 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.024)  (0.204) (0.180) (0.175) 
        
Control Variables for Representatives' Background 
Subcommittee member 0.158*** 0.151** 0.185***  0.079 0.069 0.078 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.061)  (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
        Electoral margin -0.035 -0.031 -0.013  -0.000 0.002 0.005 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.073)  (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) 
        Seniority -0.135*** -0.110*** -0.089***  0.004 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
        Retired 0.083 0.042 0.108  0.002 0.003 0.005 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.113)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
        Business background 0.049 0.051 0.050  -0.011 -0.010 -0.016 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.054)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
        Accounting interest 0.129** 0.116* 0.134**  -0.000 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.061)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
 All Representatives  Switchers only 
[Special Interests =]  
Comment Letter 
Opposition PAC 
Contributions 
(%PAC) 
IESOC PAC 
Contributions 
(%PAC) 
Implied Total 
Stock Option 
Expense per FASB 
Proposal 
 Comment Letter 
Opposition PAC 
Contributions 
(%PAC) 
IESOC PAC 
Contributions 
(%PAC) 
Implied Total 
Stock Option 
Expense per 
FASB Proposal 
 (1) (2) (3)  (6) (7) (8) 
        
Control Variables for Constituent Interests 
        Workforce in hightech 1.001** 0.902** 1.150***  0.090 0.094 0.100 
 (0.442) (0.442) (0.439)  (0.105) (0.111) (0.108) 
        Change in GDP -0.125* -0.097 -0.111  -0.031 -0.028 -0.036 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.073)  (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) 
        Employee stock option 
interest 0.085 0.055 0.164*** 
 
0.011 0.010 -0.017 
 (0.057) (0.063) (0.051)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) 
        Constant Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        N 856 856 856  124 124 124 
Adj. R-squared 0.151 0.158 0.132  0.049 0.065 0.044 
        Notes: Table 8 presents results from OLS panel regressions for the analysis of the timing of the political statements. Panel A (Panel B) presents the results for the fair 
value debate (stock option debate). The dependent variable is a binary indicator taking a value of one if the congressperson was publicly involved in the accounting 
debate at the respective date. The columns differ in the measurement of special interests. The column heading describes the special interest variable. The base measure 
for Ideology in both panels is the DW-Nominate ideology score. We run separate analyses for the aggregate sample of all representatives with special interest connections 
(All Representatives) and for the subsample of representatives who participated at only one point in time (Switchers Only). Please refer to Appendix D for a full 
description of all variables. The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors clustered by individual politician in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Ideology, Special Interests and the Content of Representatives’ Statements in the Fair Value Debate (Fall 2008) 
 
Panel A: Ideology and Special Interests of Republican Representatives 
 
Negative Statement 
= YES 
 Negative Statement 
= NO 
t-Test N Mean  N Mean 
Ideology 104 0.687  94 0.606 [<0.001]*** 
Special Interests 104 22.613  94 13.620 [0.024]** 
Panel B: Content of Fair Value Statements and Republicans’ Ideology 
Statement type 
YES  NO 
t-Test N Mean  N Mean 
Calls for ‘market-based solutions’ 18 0.804  86 0.663 [<0.001]*** 
Calls for ‘bailout alternative’ 40 0.733  64 0.659 [0.006]*** 
Calls for other alternative proposals 54 0.732  50 0.639 [<0.001]*** 
Focus on specific weakness 
of fair value accounting 
16 0.698  88 0.685 [n.s.] 
Panel C: Content of Fair Value Statements and Republicans’ Special Interest Connections 
Statement type 
YES  NO 
t-Test N Mean  N Mean 
Calls for ‘market-based solutions’ 18 22.785  86 22.368 [n.s.] 
Calls for ‘bailout alternative’ 40 22.755  64 22.524 [n.s.] 
Calls for other alternative proposals 54 21.344  50 23.984 [n.s.] 
Focus on specific weakness 
of fair value accounting 
16 43.355  86 18.842 [0.011]** 
Notes: Table 9 presents univariate statistics for fair value statements by Republican representatives issued in 
September and October 2008. Panel A shows the mean values of the DW-Nominate ideology score and the 
percentage of financial sector PAC contributions (see Appendix D for the definition of the variables) as well as the 
number of observations for Republican representatives who issued (did not issue) a statement on fair value 
accounting. Panel B and Panel C present univariate statistics on the relationship between different types of content 
of the statements and representatives’ ideology (Panel B) and special interests (Panel C). We identify the content of 
politicians’ statements by reading all individual statements and creating indicator variables that equal one if at least 
one statement made by the politician satisfied the following characteristics: Appendix E provides the definition of 
the four types of content and presents representative examples for each type. The reported p-values are based on a 
two-sided two-sample t-test. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
Ideology, Special Interests and Representatives Arguments during Stock Option Hearings 
 
Panel A: Ideology and Special Interests of Participating and Non-Participating Representatives 
 
Participated in Stock 
Option Hearing 
= YES 
 Participated in Stock 
Option Hearing 
= NO 
t-Test N Mean  N Mean 
Ideology 67 0.139  363 0.142 [n.s.] 
Special Interests 67 3.707  363 2.929 [<0.001]*** 
Panel B: Argument Categories and Hearing Participants’ Ideology 
Argument category 
Reference to 
Argument Category 
= YES 
 Reference to 
Argument Category 
= NO 
t-Test N Mean  N Mean 
Ideology-related arguments       
    Excessive executive compensation 10 -0.255  57 0.197 [0.008]*** 
    Wealth participation 20 -0.097  47 0.226 [0.014]** 
    Scandal 33 -0.004  34 0.260 [0.032]** 
Special interests-related arguments       
    Hightech industry 27 0.109  40 0.143 [n.s.] 
    Recruiting talent 32 0.109  35 0.148 [n.s.] 
Technical arguments       
    Earnings per share 14 0.380  53 0.063 [0.037]** 
    Method/concept 30 0.123  37 0.135 [n.s.] 
Panel C: Argument Categories and Hearing Participants' Special Interest Connections 
Argument category 
Reference to 
Argument Category 
= YES 
 Reference to 
Argument Category 
= NO 
t-Test N Mean  N Mean 
Ideology-related arguments       
    Excessive executive compensation 10 4.632  57 3.827 [n.s.] 
    Wealth participation 20 4.485  47 3.719 [n.s.] 
    Scandal 33 4.100  34 3.800 [n.s.] 
Special interests-related arguments       
    Hightech industry 27 5.117  40 3.158 [0.015]** 
    Recruiting talent 32 4.828  35 3.143 [0.035]** 
Technical arguments       
    Earnings per share 14 5.935  53 3.422 [0.010]** 
    Method/concept 30 4.959  37 3.128 [0.022]** 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
 
Notes: Table 10 presents univariate statistics for argument references included in statements by Representatives 
during any of the following five congressional discussions on accounting for stock options in the U.S. House of 
Representatives between 2002 and 2004: (1) Hearing before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises on May 1&14, 2002, about "Corporate Accounting Practices: Is There a 
Credibility GAAP?", (2) Hearing before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises on June 3, 2003, about "The Accounting Treatment of Employee Stock Options", (3) Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises on March 3, 2004, 
about "H.R. 3574 - The Stock Option Accounting Reform Act", (4) Hearing before the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises on April 21 & May 4, 2004, about "The FASB Stock 
Options Proposal: Its Effect on the U.S. Economy and Jobs", and (5) discussion in the full House before the voting 
on Stock Option Accounting Reform Act on July 20, 2004. Panel A shows the mean values of the DW-Nominate 
ideology score and the percentage of PAC contributions received from members of the International Employee 
Stock Option Coalition (see Appendix D for the definition of the variables) as well as the number of observations 
for Representatives who participated (did not participate) in at least one of the hearings. Panel B and Panel C present 
univariate statistics on the relationship between different types of arguments and representatives’ ideology (Panel 
B) and special interests (Panel C). We identify the references to arguments in representatives’ statements by 
counting argument-related terms and creating indicator variables that equal one if at least one statement made by 
the representative during any hearing included a corresponding term. Appendix F provides the definition of the four 
types of argument categories. The reported p-values are based on two-sided two-sample t-test. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
